

RESTRICTED

Army Code No
PROM 401

The Information given in this document is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the press or to any person not authorized to receive it.



MINOR TACTICS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

CAPTAIN TO MAJOR WRITTEN PROMOTION EXAMINATION
DIRECT REGULAR COMMISSION OFFICERS

Prepared under the direction of

Chief of Army Staff

2023

TABLE OF CONTENT

Chapter	Topic	Page
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	Phases of War.	1
2.	Principles of War.	82
3.	FIBUA.	87
4.	Crowd Dispersal.	91
5.	Cordon and Search.	94
6.	Road Blocks.	95
7.	Peace Support Operations.	102
8.	Escort Duties.	128
9.	Improvised Explosive Device	134

CHAPTER 1

PHASES OF WAR

THE QUICK ATTACK

GENERAL

1. The following drills are based on a mechanized company group. Although the sequence of events and battle procedure will be similar in a non-mechanized company or battalion group, the pace will be slower and the time taken to mount an attack will be longer. This is because move time is needed to overcome the additional difficulties caused by fewer radios and by movement on foot. A quick differs from a deliberate attack in that time for battle procedure is reduced to minimum, orders are normally passed over the radio and junior commanders work from the map. However, a quick attack requires a carefully considered plan with properly laid out fire support and sufficient time for the deployment of troops. The sequence of events at company group might be;
 - a. Quick appreciation by the company group commander.
 - b. Preliminary orders to the FOO so that artillery fire preparations being in good time.
 - c. Warning order issued by the company group commander
 - d. Deployment of assaulting troops to the FUP and the movement of supporting troops move into position to support the assault.
 - e. Orders by the company group commander. Supporting troops move into position to support the assault.
 - f. The assault.

RESTRICTED

- g. The reorganization.

2. As a guide, the following timings from contact to H Hours should be achieved with well trained mechanized troops. Quicker timings may often be possible:

- a. Company group attack – 30 to 60 minutes.
- b. Battalion group attack - 60 to 90 minutes.

QUICK APPRECIATION

3. Once a battalion or company group commander has decided to launch a quick attack on an enemy position, he must make an appreciation based on the results of contact action. A quick appreciation is not an appreciation in the formal sense but is the essential few minutes thought by the commander together with discussion and planning with his advisers leading to a plan of attack including a fire plan.

AIM

4. The aim will be the first priority to decide. There may be a time limitation.

5. **Objectives: Phases of War.** At the end of this lecture, students will be able to know and understand:

- a. Advance:
- b. Deliberate Attack.
- c. Defence.
- d. Withdrawal.

FACTORS

6. Amongst other factors the following will be considered:

- a. **Enemy.** Where the enemy is, in what strength and what he is likely to do.

RESTRICTED

b. **Ground.** Ground should be divided into left, centre, right and enemy rear and considered under the following:

- (1) Approaches.
- (2) Positions for supporting fire.
- (3) Positions for flank protection.
- (4) Obstacles.
- (5) Possible FUPs and, if infantry are in APCs, dismounting areas.

c. **Time and Space.** The time probably needed for deployment and for movement from likely start lines to the objective should be estimated. This will give H Hour and timings for the fire plan.

7. **The Plan.** From a consideration for these and other factors, a commander will make his plan.

8. **Deployment.** Components of the Force. Some or all of the following components:

a. **Assaulting Troops.** Assaulting troops will include infantry and tanks in intimate support to seize the objective. The latter give close, direct, aimed fire particularly when other forms of fire support have to stop for reasons of safety.

b. **Fire Support Troops.** Initially, fire support may be required to cover the move of the assaulting troops to the FUP. Subsequently it will be needed to give supporting fire during the assault.

c. **Flank Protection Troops.** Flank protection troops are necessary to protect the assaulting troops from enemy fire if there is an open flank.

RESTRICTED

- d. **Cut Off f Troops**. Cut off troops may be required to engage the enemy withdrawal from the objective.
 - e. **Exploitation Troops**. Exploitation troops will be required to exploit forward of the objective once the attack is successful.
9. **Combination of Tasks**. There will not usually be enough troops for all these tasks, but it is often possible for a tank platoon to do 2 or more. For instance, flank protection or cut off could be combined with exploitation; assaulting troops could be given a later task of cut off or exploitation "on my order".
11. **Warning Order**. As soon as the commander has made a quick appreciation, he will issue a warning or-der. This warning order will be issued over the radio.
12. **Action on Receipt of the Warning Order**. On receipt of the warning order:
- a. The assaulting troops will move to the FUP and meet up if not married up already. The uncertain hazards of war being what they are it is preferable for the tanks and infantry to have met at an RV further back so that the tanks leads for the rest of the way to the FUP. The FUP should be in dead ground to the objective and not a likely enemy DF task. If time allows, it is here that tank and infantry platoon commanders finally orient themselves on the ground over which they are going to assault.
 - b. Flank protection tanks move into position.
 - c. Available tanks cover the move of the assaulting and flank protections.
 - d. FOOs and MPCs complete the adjustment of fire on to the enemy positions.
 - e. The company group commander prepares his

RESTRICTED

orders in conjunction with his advisers, and joins the assaulting troops in the FUP, probably giving out his orders during his move.

13. When orders are issued over the radio, they will not be repeated at platoon level. Platoon commanders need only give out details of the information to be adopted by their own sub-units. When verbal orders are given, tank and section commanders if possible should listen to them. Final orders by junior commanders will be completed during the move forward from the FUP.

TASKS FOR HELICOPTERS

14. Helicopters are valuable in the planning, development and assault phase of a quick attack. In addition to their normal tasks, helicopters would be used to:

- a. Reconnoiter possible FUP and dismounting areas.
- b. Direct assaulting troops to their FUP.
- c. Watch an open flank and give warning of any previously unlocated enemy position.
- d. Help in orientating assaulting troops when map reading is difficult particularly during the approach to the objective.

COMPOSITION OF AN ADVANCING FORCE INTRODUCTION

15. An advancing force will normally consist of the following:

- a. Headquarters.
- b. Reconnaissance elements.
- c. Leading battalion or company groups.
- d. Detailed battalion or company groups.

- e. Flank screens or guards.

RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS

- 16.
 - a. The reconnaissance battalion, which will normally form the basis of any reconnaissance force, may be thickened up with additional reconnaissance elements and, or company groups depending on the frontage to be covered and the terrain. As a guide a reconnaissance battalion can cover up to 3 routes per company. However, it should be remembered that the additional mobility of tracked vehicles-gives each platoon greater scope for operating off roads and tracks and a route should be considered as an access within troop boundaries.
 - b. The GW platoon and surveillance platoon will probably either be kept in reserve for deployment as needed or sent to cover a flank where a tank threat is thought to exist.
 - c. The main task of the reconnaissance battalion in the advance is to locate the enemy forward and main positions. This may involve the by-passing of enemy reconnaissance elements and forward positions. The battalion will normally be found leading the advance to contact and the pursuit. In the advance in contact, reconnaissance companies should not be required to take on enemy tanks and should only lead the advance in contact when enemy opposition is expected to be light or there is sufficient room for bypassing a stronger force. When not leading the advance, the battalion is most useful for surveillance and reconnaissance on the flanks.

17. **Close Reconnaissance.** When or not reconnaissance battalion leads and advance, leading battalion group commanders will normally need their own close reconnaissance to give information about the group and enemy or the flanks. A reconnaissance element is needed to give this information. Once contact is made the battalion group commander will have to rely on the leading company groups for forward reconnaissance.

18. **In the Advance to Contact.** If the terrain is sufficiently open, the battalion group commander will push his reconnaissance element as far forward as possible up to about 5 kilometers. The reconnaissance element will normally be concerned with battalion group tasks but there may be occasions when the frontage is so wide and axis so far apart that reconnaissance sections may be placed under command of company groups.

19. **Task for Close Reconnaissance Forces by Day and Night Include:**

- a. Identification and early warning of enemy position including surveillance devices.
- b. Reporting on the going and obstacles.
- c. Finding gaps in the routes round enemy positions.
- d. Reporting on areas clear of enemy.
- e. Watching the immediate flanks.
- f. Liaison with flanking battalion and company groups.

20. **Engineering Reconnaissance Parties.** Engineer reconnaissance parties will normally move well forward within the leading element to assess engineer tasks which they will report to the engineer commander.

21. **Helicopters.** The use of the helicopters in the advance

RESTRICTED

can be invaluable where possible, leading battalion groups should be allocated a helicopter.

LEADING BATTALION GROUPS

22. An advance force may consist of a number of battalion groups and these will be designated leading or depth battalion groups. Similarly, within leading battalion groups there will be leading and depth company groups.

23. **Broad/Narrow Front.** In a brigade operation, operations on a broad front would imply two or possibly three battalion groups deployed forward on separate axis, in operation on a narrow front, only one battalion group would be deployed forward. The question of whether a battalion group can operate on a broad front is of course tied very closely to the bypassing policy of the brigade commander, which may require the battalion group commander to have his main strength in depth company groups. A battalion group commander will however be striving to advance on a broad front with two company groups leading.

24. **Movement.** The essential flexibility in the advance will hinge on a successful movement policy with clear orders understood all the way down the chain of command. Considerable forward planning by the staff will be needed to determine allocations of hides, guns areas, priorities of road movement for bridging equipment etc. There should be no doubt which HQ is controlling each portion of the cleared route and there will be a similar requirement for the coordination of traffic control.

FLANK SCREENS/GUARDS

25. The task of flank screens is to give warning of an enemy


RESTRICTED

moving against the flanks of an advancing force. The task of a flank guard is to give protection against such a threat. Flank screening/guards will carry out these tasks by moving on parallel routes to the advancing force or by picqueting flank approaches.

26. The composition of flank screens and guards will depend upon the threat, the type of advance and the nature of the country but will be the minimum compatible with security. There may consist of a combination of the following:

- a. Armoured reconnaissance platoons, although these are more likely to be deployed by formation than battalion group.
- b. Infantry, particularly when moving through close country or defiles or during a dismounted advance.
- c. Sections of mechanized infantry.
- d. Infantry anti-tank sections and armoured or infantry GW sections (if the country is open) working in conjunction with sections of the armoured reconnaissance platoon.
- e. Helicopters.

POSSIBLE GROUPING/ORDER OR MARCH FOR A



LEADING MECHANIZED BATTALION IN AN ADVANCE TO CONTACT

NOTES

1. The Battalion group is based on a mechanized infantry battalion minutes one of its rifle companies, a tank company and a field engineer troop.
2. The reconnaissance platoon could be from the divisional armoured reconnaissance battalion or the tank battalion.
3. The grouping assumes that the ground is relatively open and suitable for 2 leading company groups.
4. The organization of the flank guard and the position of the engineer troop will depend upon the threat and scale of obstacle expected. In this diagram a guard is shown on the open flank.

RESTRICTED

5. Light aircraft may be allotted to the battalion group and these may be sub-allotted to leading company groups or flank guard. The aircraft would normally operate from AI echelon and would require a landing point near Battalion Group HQ.

SPECIMEN WARNING ORDERS AND ORDERS FOR QUICK ATTACK BY A COMPANY GROUP COMMANDER

27. The following for radio orders for a quick attack.

Warning Order.


Header (a)	Example (b)
<p><u>WARNING ORDER.</u></p> <p>2. <u>SITUATION.</u> Include strength and location of any enemy who could affect the attack.</p> <p>3. <u>MISSION.</u></p> <p>4. <u>EXECUTIVE.</u></p> <p>a. <u>General Outline.</u> Include the type of attack (ie. frontal, encirclement, right flanking etc) and number of phases.</p> <p>b. <u>Grouping, Tasks & Initial Development.</u> Including the nomination of assaulting troops and troops for flank protection/fire support etc.</p> <p>c. <u>FUP.</u> Give as grid reference, in clear if within 30 minutes of H Hour.</p> <p>d. <u>Route to FUP.</u></p> <p>e. <u>H Hour.</u> Give as the earliest time, ie. Not before...</p> <p>f. <u>Time of Orders.</u></p>	<p>"Hullo Charlie Charlie... Warning order (Offered)</p> <p><u>Situation.</u> Enemy platoon with once anti-tank gun facing southeast in corner of shrub grid 123456. Suspected depth position grid 125459.</p> <p><u>Mission.</u> Destroy.</p> <p><u>General Outline.</u> Right flanking. One phase.</p> <p><u>Tasks, Assault.</u> Call sign India...and India.... Call sign Tango intimate support.</p> <p><u>Right Flank.</u> Protection: Call sign Tango...</p> <p><u>Fire Support.</u> Call sign Tango...from present locations.</p> <p><u>Cutoff.</u> Call sign Tango.....</p> <p><u>FUP.</u> Grid 130446.</p> <p><u>Route to FUP.</u> Along re-entrant running northeast from grid 125446.</p> <p><u>H Hour.</u> Not before 1255 hours.</p> <p><u>Orders.</u> In 10 minutes "Over".</p>

RESTRICTED

HEADING	EXAMPLE
(a)	(b)
<p>1. SITUATION_. If necessary details give to the warning order will confirmed as amended. Otherwise this heading will be omitted.</p> <p>2. MISSION_. This must be re-stated.</p> <p>3. EXECUTION_. a. Formation_. To be adopted. b. Tasks for Platoons. c. Task for Plank Platoons. d. Start Line. e. H Hour_. The time that assaulting troops cross the start line. Route from FUP to Objective. Only included if not obvious. f. Dismounting Area. Include if infantry are in APCs. g. Reorganization. h. Fire Plan. Targets and timings for guns and mortars. i. Special Instructions. Tasks for reconnaissance platoons, helicopters and APCs.</p>	<p>"Hullo Charlie...This is...(orders. Offered). Situation. No change except depth position grid 125459 confirmed. Strength not known. Mission. Two up, Left: Call sign India.. Right: Callsign India... Task. Callsign India... To clear left of objectives including clump of trees. Callsign Tango in Leaf to dismounting area and then give fire support from grid 126455. Callsign Tango... Right Flank protection from grid 130456. Callsign Tango... cut off from grid 128461. Exploit on my orders Start Line. Road from grid 128449 to grid 132450. H Hour, 1300 hours. Dismounting Area. Dead ground 100m short of objective. On orders Callsign India... Reorganization. Two hundred metres north facing north. Callsign India... facing north east and Callsign India... facing north west. Fire Plan. Callsign Golf HHon Objective H- 2 to H + 3. Callsign India...HE grid 125449. H to H+5 Zulu vehicles remain in dismounting area, giving intimate fire support during final assault, "OVER".</p>

A POSSIBLE LAYOUT FOR A COMPANY QUICK ATTACK

Cut off and Exploitation Element



CONCLUSION

15. The commander in the advance should hold the initiative over the enemy particularly in the advance in contact and pursuit, when the enemy will be trying to maintain an orderly withdrawal. If he is to retain the initiative, the commander must be prepared to act boldly and must issue clear directive on future intentions to his junior commanders so that they can take advantage of opportunities as they arise. The success of the advance will depend largely on the effective use of reconnaissance. Information, even if it is only negative,

RESTRICTED

must be passed back quickly and accurately. Finally, remember the importance of careful logistic planning and timely re-supply.

THE DELIBERATE ATTACK

GENERAL

28. Of all phases of war, the attack provides commander at all levels with the greater opportunity to show their initiative and flexibility. Wars are won by attacking successfully.

29. The application of the principles of war to the attack is exactly the same for mounted and dismounted, quick and deliberate attacks. APCs and helicopters allow more scope for exploiting some of these principles by rapid manoeuvre and re-deployment. Dismounted forces must always strive to apply the same principles by imaginative use of their own special characteristics, e.g. Good cross-country mobility, silent movement and concealment.

AIM

30. The aim of this lecture is to discuss the principles, terminologies and mechanics of the attack.

TYPE OF ATTACK

31. There are various types of attack and not only day or night attacks. These are:

a. **The Encounter Battle or Quick Attack.** These are mounted at low level (Platoon or Company). The object of this form of attack is usually to maintain the momentum of an advance to contact. Battle procedure is reduced to a minimum, orders are abbreviated, little time is available for reconnaissance and fire support may be limited.

b. **The Deliberate Attack.** This type is normally mounted against a well prepared enemy position. It is rarely carried out below company level as the enemy has

the advantage of ground, cover from fire obstacles, planned and heavy fire support. The attacking force has the disadvantage or restriction of manoeuvre but does gain additional fire support, detailed reconnaissance opportunities and elaborate preparation. It is time consuming and will halt the momentum of an advance.

c. **The Infiltration Attack.** This type of attack should only be done by very well trained troops. The method used is to filter unseen through forward enemy positions in order to reach rear objectives. The aim of the attack is to surprise the enemy and force him off-balance. This can be achieved by:

- (1) Seizing a piece of unheld, but tactically important ground behind the enemy forward positions.
- (2) Attacking a key depth position while the forward positions are being attacked in a conventional way.

PRINCIPLES

32. The following principles are common to all kinds of attack:

- a. Cooperation.
- b. Combat Intelligence.
- c. Ground.
- d. Concentration of Forces.
- e. Surprise.
- f. Speed.
- g. Momentum and Depth.
- h. Administration.

33. At battalion group level, the 3 most important principles of the attack are surprise, momentum and security:

RESTRICTED

- a. **Surprise.** In any offensive operation, the commander will have the initiative in that he can choose the time and place, and should be able therefore to achieve a measure of surprise. The better organized the defence, the more necessary it will be to have a plan deceive the enemy as to the time and place of the attack. Deception should be planned and designed to mislead the enemy air and ground reconnaissance and his radio and electronic interception units.
- b. **Maintaining the Momentum.** The key to successes in offensive operations is maintaining momentum. This helps retention of the initiative and prevents the enemy from sealing off an initial penetration, from mounting a counter attack and from reforming his reserve. The methods by which momentum can be achieved are outline later.
- c. **Security.** Offensive action must be launched from a secure area. It is not essential that it is occupied by our own fire, that it cannot be occupied by the enemy or dominated by his fire. When an objective has been seized, it must be secured against enemy counter attack and as a jumping off point for the next phase of the operation.

TERMINOLOGIES

34. Deliberate attacks are those mounted against enemy positions with time for reconnaissance at the lowest level of command. Assaulting troops may have little room for manoeuvre but this disadvantage is compensated for by weight of fire support from tanks, artillery, aircraft and sometimes ships. Infantry may be on foot, mounted in APC's or lifted by support helicopters.

RESTRICTED

35. The following 4 standard terms apply to all types of attack at battalion group level and are defined as follows:

a. **Assemble Area**. An area where final administrative preparations or regrouping of battalion and company groups take place before an attack. It should be:

- (1) Free from enemy ground observation.
- (2) Concealed from enemy visual air reconnaissance.
- (3) Easily accessible.
- (4) If possible, out of range of enemy mortars.

b. **Forming Up Place (FUP)**. An area to which troops deploy immediately before an attack and in which they may adopt their assault formations. It allows a buffer of time between the move forward and crossing the start line at H hour. The FUP is occupied for as short time as possible although it is here that final orders or briefings may be given or orientation carried out. It is outside the FEVA it must be reconnoitered and protected before the assaulting troops move into it. The area chosen should be:

- (1) Easily recognizable.
- (2) Not under direct fire or enemy ground observation.
- (3) Not a known or likely enemy DF target.

c. **Start Line (SL)**. The line which assaulting troops cross at H hour. It is normally the forward edge of the FUP. It must be easily recognizable and preferably square to the objective. The start line is used to help align the attacking troops with objective. All timings for fire and manoeuvre plans are based on the time troops cross the start line. It must be secure.

- d. **Final Assault Position.** An area close to the objective where the assaulting troops, if not already so deployed, adopt their formation for the final assault. It may not be possible to laydown the precise position at orders and it is more likely to be indicated by radio or verbal during attack.

THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT APPROACH

36. It has been observation with some past commanders that they must challenge the enemy strength rather than play on his weaknesses. This is exemplified often by the stereotype frontal attack on strongly defended positions. On occasions, this may be the only possible course, but it should never be chosen if there is a better option. To attack the enemy from some unexpected direction is generally far more effective.

37. Battalion group commanders will have to decide whether to shoot the direct or indirect approach or a combination of both. The course adopted will depend largely on whether the enemy can be outflanked or infiltrated, and whether there is sufficient depth for maoeuvre.

38. At battalion group level it is difficult to employ the indirect approach if the defender is deployed in positional defence with mutual support, because the defender's flanking of depth positions will catch the attacker in enfilade. However, this may not be so against an enemy who has adopted mobile defence.

CONDUCT OF BATTLE

39. The deliberate attack can be divided conveniently into 5 phase although during battle it will not be easy always to distinguish between them. The phases are:

- a. **The Preparatory Phase.** Reconnaissance

RESTRICTED

are completed, warning orders sent out, orders prepared and issued.

b. **The Deployment Phase.** Troops for the attack regroup if necessary, prepare for action and move to their FUPs.

c. **The Approach and Assault Phase.** The attacking troops approach their objectives, and assault the enemy defensive positions.

d. **The Reorganization Phase.** The attacking troops reorganize in the area of their objective in order to defeat any enemy counter attack.

e. **The Exploitation Phase.** The attacking troops exploit any enemy weakness and destroy and withdrawing enemy.

LOCATING THE ENEMY REQUIREMENTS

40. Effective planning depends on accurate detailed intelligence of the enemy and his position. The information required to produce this intelligence will include:

- a. Topography including natural and artificial obstacles.
- b. Dispositions including reserves.
- c. Capabilities and likely reactions.
- d. Locations and layout of surveillance and illumination devices and the design for their employment.

TIMINGS

41. The building up of information may take an hour, part of a day or much longer. The information is likely never to be complete but the more accurate the picture of the enemy, the greater change of the attack being successful.

GAINING INFORMATION

42. It is an all arms task to gain detailed information. Contact

RESTRICTED

action will provide certain information but it will be necessary to continue to observe enemy activity over a period to build up the intelligence picture.

43. Information may be gained from higher HQ and by using some or all of the following sources:

- a. Static infantry and artillery Ops.
- b. Infantry patrols, possibly with representatives of other arms.
- c. Mobile reconnaissance elements.
- d. Visual and photographic area reconnaissance.
- e. Short range and mortar locating radars.
- f. Electronic, infra-red, intensification and audio detection devices.

PLANNING THE ATTACK INITIAL ACTION

44. After receiving his orders, a commander should:

- a. Clarify his aim if necessary, so that he is in no doubt as to his task and about any limitations, imposed by the higher commander.
- b. Make a quick time appreciation so that he uses the time available to the best advantage. Only in this way will the commander ensure that his subordinates have their share of the time for their reconnaissance, planning and issue of orders.
- c. Initiate a warning order if this has not been sent already.
- d. Once this initial action has been completed, the commander will carry out his reconnaissance and makes his appreciation and plan.

APPRECIATION

46. **Method.** The commander's appreciation is a process of logical thought leading to a sound plan. At battalion group level it will rarely be written but often it will help to jot down salient points in note form. The commander will discuss the various factions with his advisers from other arms before making the decisions on which the plan will be based.

47. **Points to be Decided.** The following are the main point to be decided by the commander as a result of this appreciation:

- a. How to gain surprise.
- b. The phase, grouping and allocation of troops for each phase including flank protection if necessary.
- c. The provision of the reserve in all phase.
- d. Methods of negotiating obstacles.
- e. Assembly areas, FUPs and start lines.
- f. The movement plan including timings and formations for each phase, boundaries, bounds and report lines.
- g. The fire plan including air craft guns, tanks and infantry support weapons.
- h. The air defence plan throughout all phases.
- i. Reorganization, in particular the plan for moving F- echelon transport and support weapon forward.
- j. Exploitation task and allocation of troops for them.
- k. Resupply.
- l. Control of the battle.

EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS

PRINCIPLES

48. Tanks always fight as formed sub-units so that the battalion group commander can make best use of their flexibility in each tactical phase.

49. The following principles should be observed in deciding how to make the best use of armour in the attack:

- a. Tanks in the deliberate attack will be deployed to give intimate support to the infantry, to give fire support from a greater distance and to provide flank protection.
- b. The best fire support that tanks can give to infantry is from static position. However, in order to give direct fire support it is likely that tanks will have to move to forward fire position during an attack.
- c. Some tanks should accompany the infantry to the immediate area of each objective so that intimate direct support is available during the assault phase when other forms of fire support may have had to stop for safety reasons.
- d. The majority of the tanks should be released as soon as possible on reorganization so that they are available either to support subsequent phases or to carryout replenishment and maintenance. Some tanks however, may be required to remain on the objective to provide a framework for anti-armour defence against counter attack.

TASKS

50. The tasks for tanks are therefore to:

- a. Destroy enemy weapons, particularly enemy tanks likely to hold up infantry.

RESTRICTED

- b. Support the infantry in seizing the objective.
- c. Assisting the defeat of counter attacks.
- d. Exploit success.

INFANTRY/TANK ATTACK TACTICS GENERAL

51. In an infantry/Tank attack:
- a. Either tanks or dismounted infantry can lead. The lead may change during the approach or for the actual assault.
 - b. Tanks can move on the same or on a different axis to the infantry.
 - c. There may be occasions, because of the nature of the ground or obstacles, when it is impossible for tanks to move forward. Dismounted infantry must assault then without the intimate support of armour although the range and accuracy of tank guns still allow fire support to be given from static positions in rear or to a flank.
52. Whichever method is adopted; it is essential that the attacking troops should be able to indicate targets to each other quickly and effectively.
53. Infantry in APCs can dismount short of on or through the objective.
54. Tanks may form or be a part of each of the components of an attacking force. Some tanks may carry out 2 tasks. For example, tanks initially with the assaulting troops may be used later with the exploiting troops.

INTIMATE SUPPORT TANKS

55. **Operating with Mechanized Infantry**

a. **Approach to the objective in Open Country.**

Tanks lead APC's from the FUP to the dismounting area, using stabilized main arm ament and MG fire and support the infantry on to the objective.

b. **Action at Objectives in Country too Close for Tanks.**

(1) If the dismounting area is short of the objective in dead ground, the APCs pass through the tanks at the last moment, while the latter remain non ground where they can engage the objective.

(2) If the dismounting area is short of the objective but not in dead ground, the infantry dismount behind the tanks and assault through them.

(3) In each case the tanks immediately use fire and movement to side-stop to positions on a flank from which they can give best support.

(4) Tanks should aim to keep out of range of enemy hand held anti-tank weapons and will put down maximum suppressive fire.

(5) Tanks may be used also with cut off and/or with exploiting troops.

(6) **Action at objectives in Broken or Open Country.** At least 1the intimate support tanks should accompany the infantry on to the objective. The other 1/2 may be used to man oeuvre round the flanks of the objective.

RESTRICTED

(7) Whenever the dismounting area, the infantry dismount behind the tanks and assault through them.

c. **As the Infantry Dismount.** All tanks put down the maximum supporting fire as the infantry dismount, to give them cover while they oriented themselves before they fight through the objective.

d. **Fighting Through.**

(1) Tanks will give as much help to the infantry as possible by destroying enemy positions and putting down speculative fire in front of the infantry advance.

(2) Those tanks accompanying the infantry onto the objective will move with them, rather than ahead.

56. **Operating with Dismounted Infantry.**

a. **Axis during the Approach to the Objective.**

(1) **Tanks and Infantry on the Same Axis.**

Control and target indication are easier but the infantry may mask the fire of the tanks, particularly during final assault, and the tanks may draw fire on to the infantry.

(2) **Tanks and Infantry on Different Axis.**

The tank supporting fire is not masked at any stage and can be continue longer, but control and target indication are more difficult, and the tanks may be more vulnerable.

b. **Tanks or Infantry in the Lead.**

(1) **Close Country and/or Strong Anti-Armour Defence.**

(a) Infantry lead at their own speed.

(b) Tanks give supporting fire from rear or flanks, depending on the axis chosen.

(b) Tanks move from fire position to fire position at their best speed without getting ahead of the infantry.

(2) **Open Country and /or Weak Anti-Armour Defence.**

(a) Tanks lead using fire and movement, ahead or to the flanks of the infantry.

(b) Infantry follow at their own speed.

(3) The lead must be change during the approach if the circumstance alter.

c. **The final Assault.** Tanks act as described for the mounted attack. The decision as to whether they accompany the infantry onto the objective depends on:

(1) Whether or not there are obstacles in the way.

(2) How close the ground is on the objective.

THE REORGANIZATION AND EXPLOITATION PHASE

GENERAL

55. As each objective is seized:
- a. Company group commanders will prepare immediately to defeat any enemy counter attack.
 - b. The battalion group commander will carry out the next phase of his plan which will include exploitation to retain the initiative.

ACTION BY COMPANY COMMANDERS

56. At the end of the assault, company group commander will:
- a. Send a situation report to the battalion group commander.
 - b. Immediately go round the position to coordinate the defensive layout against both round and air attack. This will include the selection of tasks for tank platoon and if possible, the adjustment tasks of DF targets and the planning of additional ones.
 - c. Make arrangements for support weapon to be brought forward and deployed without delay.
 - d. Ensure that digging of positions starts at once.
 - e. Send out patrols to give local protection.
 - f. Against an armoured threat, organize the surface laying of protective minefields astride likely approaches.
57. During this phase there will be opportunities also for administrative action, the drills for which will be laid down in SOPs. These will include:
- a. Evacuation of wounded and prisoners.
 - b. Quick replenishment of patrol and ammunition.
 - c. Repairs of equipment.

ACTION BY THE BATTALION GROUP COMMANDER

58. After the assault phase the battalion group commander has 2 tasks:

- a. To ensure the security of the captured positions.
- b. Planned exploitation and opportunity exploitation when ever the enemy has been forced off balance.

59. In order to carry out this task, the battalion group commander will:

- a. With his advisers, coordinate the ground and air defence of the positions.
- b. Employ his reconnaissance forces both on the ground and in the air to provide information about the enemy.
- c. Provide and deploy mobile, hard-hitting forces for exploitation tasks.
- d. Ensure that further action is not delayed by want of supplies.

60. Speed is the key to success in exploitation because time will allow the enemy to regroup, regain his balance and counter attack. Therefore, the task of the exploitation force is to prevent the enemy from reorganizing his force or conducting an orderly withdrawal. Objectives will be chosen either laterally or in depth and calculated risks should be accepted in order to maintain momentum.

FIRE SUPPORT THE FIRE PLAN

61. Without effective neutralization of enemy indirect and direct fire weapons, it may not be possible for our own assaulting

forces to reach their objective without unacceptable casualties. For this reason, it is essential that the best use is made of available supporting fire weapons. The battalion group commander does this by making a fire plan.

62. **Timings**. Indirect fire weapons and FGA will normally fire in accordance with a timed programme. The programme is easy to modify so that leading troops can get as close as is possible to their objective consistent with safety, before the fire lifts. Direct fire weapon is used primarily for intimate support of assaulting troops they may be used on the timed fire plan, during the initial approach from the start line, against forward slope enemy positions or pin-point targets. If the battalion group commander is not prepared to commit himself to particular timings for all or some of the targets, they can be on call. Defensive fire targets areal ways on call.

63. **Fire Unit and Ammunition Availability**. As a general principle, fire units should be concentrated onto a few targets than scattered over a large area. The number of fire units and ammunition available are factors that the battalion group commander will take account of when making his plan. Shortage of either may preclude a frontal assault, a shortage of ammunition may influence the commander towards a covered approach from the start line, albeit longer and more difficult than a direct open approach.

64. **Deception**. Deceptive measures in fire plan will be part of the group commander's deception plan. Examples of how this may be achieved are:

- a. Pauses in the fire plan.
- b. Dummy runs by FGA aircraft.

65. **Fire Planning**. Detail on the suitability of the different

supporting fire weapons for various targets are given during fire planning lecture.

66. **Deployment of Fire Units.** All fire units are deployed to support the attack, with the minimum of movement. Artillery must be able to support the attack reorganization, exploitation and any counter attack, with minimum of movement. Infantry and arm our supporting fire weapons are brought to the new positions as soon as possible, ready for exploitation and enemy counter attack.

EMPLOYMENT OF OBSERVERS

67. In the deliberate attack, observers may be deployed to:

- a. Provide continuity of observation and to adjust fire from static Ops.
- b. Move forward with the attacking troops in order to deal with unexpected targets, request modification of the fire plan if necessary and to pass back information.

68. The tactical plan, the ground and visibility will dictate the best deployment of observers and the way FOOs and MFGs move. They can move either by bounds from one position of observation to another or with forward troops. At night they should move with company groups.

ENGINEER TASKS

69. Engineer task are planned as part of the operational plan for the attack. A battalion group may have field and/or mechanized engineers in support or under command and the battalion group commander will be advised by the engineer squadron or troop commander.

70. Time must be allowed in the planning stage for reconnaissance and the provision of stores, plant and equipment.

PRIMARY TASKS

71. These include:
- a. Opening, developing and maintaining routes.
 - b. Crossing all types of obstacles including breaching mine fields.
 - c. Assault demotion of concrete obstacles and bunkers.

SECONDARY TASKS

72. These include:
- a. Defensive works and minelaying to assist in defeating counter attack.
 - b. The hasty preparation of helicopter landing sites.

GENERAL

73. Apart from performing their normal offensive tasks in support of the attack aircraft may also be called upon to provide observation, reconnaissance and limited logistic support.

OBSERVATION AND RECONNAISSANCE

74. Helicopters can help to acquire information on enemy disposition and defenses prior to the attack. During these assault, it could be used as air OPS to adjust fire, and observe to the flanks. On reorganization, helicopters may be able to give observation in depth particularly on the movement of enemy reserves.

F ECHELON TRANSPORT INTRODUCTION

75. The composition, control and movement of F echelon transport is very largely an infantry problem. This is because the infantry is the only arm which may have to fight separately from its vehicles, and yet depends upon these vehicles as much as any other arm for replenishment and for the carriage of heavier equipment and weapons. An added complication is when

RESTRICTED

infantry rely on wheeled vehicles which can not follow the path of an infantry man on foot.

76. In this section, the worst case is taken, that of a battalion group with out APCs.

GENERAL

77. F echelon comprises those vehicles carrying weapons, equipment, ammunition and stores without which it is impossible for the infantry to continue to fight. In the attack they must reach the objective as soon as it has been cleared.

78. There are many difficulties which can delay or prevent the arrival of F echelon transport. The most common are:

- a. Obstacles between the start line and objective.
- b. Loss of direction due to darkness and poor traffic control.
- c. Enemy interference by aircraft, shelling, mines and ambushes.

79. Battalion groups should cover the composition, control and movement of their F echelon transport in SOP/s. The system adopted should be flexible, but should be understood thoroughly and well- practiced.

COMPOSITION GROUPING AND COMMAND

80. The number of vehicles in F echelon will vary between battalion groups and for different operations. The vehicles should be split into company group packets, each of which has a commander. Loading is a company group responsibility.

81. The movement of the F echelon transport group will be the responsibility of the battalion group HQ. Company group

RESTRICTED

packets maybe commanded by the officer, warrant officer, or the senior NCO traveling with the support weapons.

MOVEMENT

82. F echelon transport will move to an F echelon vehicle park which will be the assembly area. If possible, a separate commander should be found for this park which should:

- a. Have are as on ably firm standing.
- b. Have sufficient space for forming up.
- c. Have good routes in and out.
- d. Provide concealment from ground and air observation.
- e. Be out of enemy ear shot.
- f. Not an obvious artillery target.

83. It is essential that the park remains in radio contact with the battalion group commander who will give the order for the company group packets to move for ward. The commander will order the move for ward as soon as his battalion group or individual company groups are firm and the routes up are clear. In deciding when to give the order, he will be governed also by:

- a. The need to get antitank guns, mortars defense stores and replenishment ammunition for ward.
- b. The need for the better communications and working condition which vehicles will give.
- c. The danger of allowing soft skinned vehicles to be come involved in the battle.

84. The timings for the move forward of the company group packets is critical and a correct solution is not easy. Their timely arrival is essential operationally and also raises morale, but arrival too early may result in their loss or may be an encumbrance to

soldiers still fighting. An intermediate position, known as a vehicle waiting area, will normally be used to assist control.

PROTECTION

85. The protection of the echelon is important shelling, air activity and ground attack by ambush parties and patrols, spacing minimizes damages from shelling and air activity but in crease then a vigilance problem.

86. All members of the echelon should be ready for an ambush and should be practiced in anti-ambush drills. Alertness is essential and if the danger of ambush is really great, an escort may be needed for the protection of the echelon.

RECEPTION AND DISPERSAL

87. Just short of the objective, a release point should be established, to which all packets report. An officer or the RSM should be in charge. Packets are met by company group guides to lead them forward to their positions.

TRAFFIC CONTROL

88. Radio communication will be required between the release point, the vehicle waiting area and the F echelon vehicle park. In addition, the route may be patrolled.

USE OF HELICOPTERS

89. Helicopters can be used for bringing forward support weapons, particularly anti-tank guns when tanks are limited in numbers and there is an armoured threat.

90. In this case, the commander of the anti-tanks section will travel with company group HQ and will reconnoiter positions for the weapons as soon as possible after the assault. Helicopters

RESTRICTED

will if forward the weapons and ammunition from the Fechel on vehicle part on orders from the company commander.



CONCLUSION

91. Infiltration attack is not discussed in this lecture. However, the conduct of the might attack which you must understand is discussed in Tactics lecture notes precis'.

Annexes:

- A. Diagrammatic Deployment for Attack.
- B. Example of Battle Procedure Timings for a Battalion Group Deliberate Attack.
- C. Diagrammatic Layout of a Dismounted Infantry Attack Support by Tanks.

RESTRICTED



THE NIGHT ATTACK

INTRODUCTION GENERAL

92. The principles and tactics used in day attacks apply largely to operations at night. Indeed, on a bright night the differences between a day and night attack may be only marginal. On the other hand, in darkness with cloud, mist, harmattan dust, rain or smoke there is little ambient light; what is possible by day may be impossible at night.

93. Offensive operations are undertaken at night and in condition of reduced visibility to:

- a. Achieve surprise.
- b. Maintain momentum.
- c. Minimize the effect of enemy air and ground fire.
- d. Reduce the effectiveness of enemy counter attacks.

94. The aim is to seize ground within or behind an enemy position. This will either make subsequent offensive operation easier or so substance the enemy that he is forced either to fightata disadvantage or to with draw.

TYPES OF ATTACKS

95. In addition to the normal day light quick or deliberate attacks night attacks may be:

- a. **Noise or Silent.** In noise attack uses all available support from the outside; this method is used when there is little chance of achieving surprise by stealth. In such eases, deception measures must be planned to conceal the place, scope, direction and timing of the assault. The silent attack is one method of achieving surprise. It is connected with planned fire support on call.

RESTRICTED

- b. **Illuminated or Dark.** Although white light will of tenbere served for the less stage of the assault, the attacker can decide whether to order the use of white light at some point of his choosing or attack without it, keeping planned illumination on call.

PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

- 96. Night attacks are unlikely to be successful unless:
 - a. Adequate intelligence of the enemy has been obtained.
 - b. The enemy surveillance cap ability is known.
 - c. Troops have been thoroughly trained in operating at night.
 - d. The plan is simple.
 - e. Measures have been taken to achieve surprise.

INFORMATION

- 97. Information is required about:
 - a. Enemy positions.
 - b. Patrols.
 - c. Obstacles and defensive fire.
 - d. Enemy surveillance and night fighting devices.
 - e. NVP.
 - f. Terrain.
- 98. This can be obtained by:
 - a. Contact action.
 - b. Day light reconnaissance.
 - c. Patrols and probing attacks to make the enemy reveal his NVP.

- 99. The information about the enemy's NVP attack:

RESTRICTED

- a. The plan for neutralizing enemy devices by deception arrangements, electronic counter measures, conventional fire powers or attack.
- b. The approaches to the objectives which must, if possible, be in low ground and out of the line of sight of the defender's devices.
- c. The at tacker's illumination plan.

SIMPLICITY

100. Control and movement by night are difficult, so plans should be kept simple. Simplicity is achieved by having:

- a. A limited clear-cutaimandan uncomplicated plan. Clear briefly and orders based on a realistic assessment of tasks, capability and timings.
- b. SOPs understood and practiced by all ranks. These should cover the layout of assembly areas and FUPs, formations for the move forward, route marking, methods of identification immediate action drills and more of Fechelon vehicles.
- c. Clear and simple control arrangements including good fire discipline to minimize the risk of friendly forces classing.
- d. Regrouping between phases kept to a minimum.
- e. The allocation and coordination of all surveillance and illumination devices at the highest practicable level; this will normally beat battalion group HQ in the initial stages.

SURPRISE

101. Surprise is the major advantage of a night attack.

RESTRICTED

Measures which a battalion group can take to achieve surprise include:

- a. Creating a diversion by noise or by illuminating areas away from them a in attack.
- b. Using radar or the noise of tracked vehicles to suggest movement away from the main attack area.
- c. Neutralizing enemy surveillance and night vision devices by use of smoke or white light ratcritical moments in the battle.
- d. Conducting the attack with out fire support or illumination at least until surprise has been lost.
- e. Taking advantage of difficult weather conditions.

RECONNAISSANCE

102. As much day light reconnaissance as possible must be carried out, the enemy will try to prevent day light reconnaissance of this positions but, even though the attack may have the capability to mount quick attacks in darkness, every effort must be made to let junior commanders see in daylight the ground over which they are to attack.

103. However, due to tactical urgency, the distance to be covered to reach the assaulting position and the topography may preclude visual reconnaissance. It may therefore be necessary to rely on indirect reconnaissance using maps, air photographs and any other source of relevant information. Troops must be trained in the techniques of operating at night without daylight reconnaissance.

OBJECTIVES

104. These must be easily identifiable. The less it has been

RESTRICTED

possible to carry out daylight reconnaissance, the more difficult it will be to retain control during the attack. The width and depth of objectives are therefore, normally less than in a day attack.

APPROACHES

105. Accurate direction finding is difficult at night and approaches to FUPs should be a cross open country or be clearly defined or marked.

106. Axis of advance from the FUP for each phase should if possible:

- a. Beat right angles to the start line.
- b. Lead straight to the objective.
- c. Follow an easily definable feature.

H HOUR

107. The selection of H hour will depend on the time required to prepare for the attack and the need for speed to maintain pressure on the enemy. These requirements may conflict. When the FUP and start line are outside the FEBA and only an indirect reconnaissance of the ground for the approach is possible, it may be impracticable to give H hour in orders. In this case the timing of H hour may have to be given out over the radio as the assaulting troops approach their FUP.

ILLUMINATION PLAN

108. **General**: An illumination plan must be made in addition to, and in the same way, as a fire plan. Details are issued at battalion and company group commanders orders. The aim of the illumination plan is to:

- a. Aid direction keeping.

- b. Increase the effectiveness of both direct fire and observed indirect fire.
- c. Saturate the enemy's infra-red viewers and image intensifiers with white light.

109. **Use Against an Enemy Without Aids:** Against an enemy not equipped with infra-red viewing aids, the commander has a choice between using infra-red or white light. In deciding whether or not to use infra-red, the following considerations apply:

- a. Unlike white light, infra-red can be used as a driving aid with out detection.
- b. To change from infra-red to white light at different stages of the attack required tanks to alter their sights and search light filters.
- c. The higher the ambient light level, the less effective is infra-red. Strong white light, e.g. enemy flares, can make infra- red useless.

110. **Use Against an Enemy with Aids.** Against an enemy equipped with infra-red, the illumination plan should be based on white light and image intensification except:

- a. Infra-red viewers can be used to detect enemy infra-red.
- b. Infra-red aids can be used along covered routes but only in the early stages of deployment.
- c. Active infra-red can be used during reorganization to cover likely enemy approaches.

111. **White Light Illumination.** Gun, mortar, anti-tankgun, and possible aircraft flares provide the greater part of the white light illumination plan and these must be carefully coordinated to

RESTRICTED

ensure that they do not reveal the attacking troops. Tank searchlights can produce effective white light on the objective blinding the defenders as well as enabling other tanks to engage the objective.

Examples: An illumination plan for an infantry tank attack might be the Approach:

- a. **Assaulting Tanks**. Dark.
- b. **Supporting Tanks**. Image intensification (CVR) and passive infra-red viewing.
- c. **Guns/Mortars/Carl Gustavs**. On call to illuminate selected areas except for specific task, e.g. deception plans or aid to direction finding.
- d. Control Retained by the battalion group commander.

THE ASSAULT

112. **Assaulting Tanks**. White light searching lights to illuminate the objective.

113. **Supporting Tanks**. White lights search lights but from one or both flanks.

114. **Guns/mortars/Carl Gustavs**. White light illumination slightly beyond and to the sides of the objectives.

115. **Control**. Decentralized to accompany group commanders.

REORGANIZATION

116. **Tanks**. Use of searchlights and active infra-red to cover likely enemy approaches.

117. **Carl Gustav**. White light on call for target illumination. Sited along side anti-tank guns and guide weapons.

RESTRICTED

118. **Guns and Mortar.** White light on call to give area illumination.
119. **Trips Flares.** Sited to cover the likely enemy infantry approaches.

USE OF RADAR

120. Possible uses of radar in offensive night operations are:
- a. As an aid to navigation, e.g. directing patrols to their objectives or around areas of enemy activity.
 - b. Surveying infiltration routes for enemy activity.
 - c. Following the progress of our own infiltrating troops particularly their passage through bounds and report lines when radio silence is necessary.
 - d. The adjustment of fire.
 - e. Coordinating supporting fire with troops movements.
 - f. Covering exposed flanks to give warning of the enemy.
 - g. Detecting enemy reinforcement's withdrawal or re-deployment.
 - h. Mortar and gun locating.

INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT

121. **General.** Whether or not the attack should be completely silent depends on the enemy, e.g. his alertness, whether he has modern night surveillance equipment and the likelihood of encountering wire, trip flare or other obstacles. A silent approach to the final assault position followed by a noisy assault is likely to have the following advantages:

- a. The effects on the enemy's morale of a sudden concentration of fire followed quickly by an assault, can

be considerable.

b. It minimizes the effects of setting off trip flames, running unsuspected wire or fixed line fire, when it is too late to call. It is simple.

122. **Noisy Attacks**. Fire support is arranged as for a day attack, encounter enemy night vision devices and illumination. However, to avoid loss of surprise in the early stage of an attack and to conserve ammunition, noisy attacks should not be planned to start before surprise is expected to be lost.

123. **Silent Attacks**. The type of support for a silent attack, which must be carefully planned to cover the whole operations, maybe:

a. **On Call**. Targets are selected, but the guns and mortars are not necessarily laid on them. This is more flexible than the timed programme as it allows the guns and mortars to be used on other tasks until called for.

b. **Timed Programme**. This can be planned on an Hour basis and be activated by the artillery commander at the appropriate time from Hour.

c. **Adjustment**. Depending on the accuracy required, daylight adjustment may be necessary. If circumstance preclude adjustment, then prediction must be used but commanders must understand that accuracy may be prejudiced. Artillery commanders will advise on the implications.

d. **Control**. The authority for opening fire in a silent attack must be clearly defined. It is probable that the

RESTRICTED

battalion group commander will retain this authority during the approach to FUP, thereafter permitting company group commanders to call for fire as soon as surprise is lost.

USE OF TANKS AT NIGHT GENERAL

124. The basic difference between the use of tanks in a night or day attacks is that tank must never be interspersed with dismounted infantry at night.

TACTICS

125. Tanks tasks in a night attack are increased by the requirement for them to produce illumination and are:

- a. Dismounted Attack.
- b. Illuminating Group.
- c. Fire Support Group.
- d. Mounted Attack.
- e. Illuminating Group.
- f. Fire Support Group.
- g. Intimate Support Group.

Illuminating and fire support tasks may be combined with the tasks in one group proving both illumination and fire.

ILLUMINATING GROUP

126. **Direct Illumination**. There are 2 ways of providing direct illumination:

- a. **Supporting from one Position**. The illuminating tanks operate from one position, which must be within search light range of the objective. This will depend on ground and weather conditions. This position should provide flank illumination for fire by the fire support tanks

RESTRICTED

and could be on the opposite flank of the attack to the latter if the final assault plan and the ground permit.

b. **Support by Manoeuvre**. When the objective is beyond search light range, illuminating tanks will have to manoeuvre to the assault, so as to be in position to provide illumination during the final stages of the assault.

127. **Aids to Movement**. Illuminating tanks may have the task of helping movement with:

- a. Indirect search light illumination.
- b. Boundary illumination, by shining beams periodically down the flanks of the attack, tanks with this task should be defiladed from the objective.

FIRE SUPPORT GROUP

128. Fire support tanks have their normal daytime task of providing aimed fire support on to the objective. Depend in gon the circumstances of the attack they may have to manoeuvre to the flank of the assault force. Generally, they will have the task of watching of enemy use of active infra- red and of countering it. For a dismounted attack, some or all of the support tanks should move to the flank of the objective to cut off withdrawing enemy and protect the infantry during reorganization.

ASSAULT GROUP

129. **Dismounted Attack (See Annex A)**. The infantry will move straight to the objective support by:

- a. The fire support group.
- b. The illuminating group.

RESTRICTED

c. Finally, those tanks from the fire support group moving to cutoff the enemy and to protected organization.

130. **Mounted Attack (See Annex B).** The intimate support tanks lead at best speed to the objective using stabilized main armament and MG fire. When the dismounting point is reached, some tanks will move to a flank and will continue to give intimate support with fire and white light, but remaining out of range from the majority of enemy hand-held anti-armour weapons. At the dismounting point, some tanks may drive straight on through objective, using white light to shoot on the move. A decision to do so will depend on the ground and the enemy. Although tanks driving through a position may destroy some defenders and demoralize others, they are relatively blind and vulnerable to a determined enemy.

131. When tanks do drive the objective, they will either act as a cut off group and then protect the position during reorganization, or they may have an exploitation task. When no tanks drive through and no separate cut off group is nominated, the intimate support tanks will deal with withdrawing enemy and protect the position during reorganization.

132. **Formations in the Assault.** The formation to be used when moving to the dismounting point will depend on visibility. If there is enough light, the complete move is best in daylight assault formation. There will be no difference from the day time technique. If it is very dark it will be better and quicker to drive in line ahead or staggered line ahead, adopting the assault formation radio orders at the final assault position. The assault group must be prepared at all times for the enemy to use white light. This is probably his natural reaction once he detects the

assault. As soon as illumination starts, the group must keep dispersed.

133. **Reorganization**. In a dismounted attack, plans must be made for tanks to join the infantry on the objective as soon as it is secure. All or some of the tanks must wait on the position to help defeat counter attacks, at least until the arrival of the infantry F echelon vehicles and weapons.

ROUTES FUP AND START LINES GENERAL

134. The main difficulties in launching night attack are navigation, the reorganization and providing of the routes forward, and the layout and control of FUPs. These difficulties are particularly apparent in the case of an attack mounted from outside the FEBA. Under the worst conditions of darkness, some artificial aids to route marking may have to be used but these should be reduced to the minimum that will allow a battalion or company group to operate efficiently. The actual method of marking will vary according to the type of operation, the organization of the battalion group. The terrain, the enemy and the standard of training, will be laid down in SOPs. Artificial aids which may be used include:

- a. Tape, but not with in the FEBA.
- b. Torches on trip flare pickets with shutters to give different coloured lights, arrows, letters or numbers.
- c. Tailor convoy lights of reconnaissance and similar vehicles.
- d. Reflectors.
- e. Tracer in noisy attack.

ATTACKS MOUNTED FROM WITHIN THE FEBA

135. **Marking of Routes**. The marking within the FEBA may entail the use of guides and artificial aids at critical points. The responsibility for marking may be given to the surveillance platoon or the regimental police.

136. **Marking of the FUP and Start Line**. The marking of the FUP and start line within the FEBA will normally be the responsibility of the harbour party.

ATTACKS MOUNTED FROM OUT SIDE THE FEBA

137. **Providing of Routes and the FUP**. When an attack is to be mounted from outside the FEBA, either by infiltration or from a flank, it will be necessary to probe the routes forward and protect the FUP before and during its occupation by the assaulting troops. (See Annex C). These tasks may be given to a fighting patrol the surveillance platoon or a company group depending on the nature and scale of the attack. This probing and protecting force may also include guides and a party to lay out the FUP and start line.

138. **Marking of Routes**. Outside the FEBA, marking should only resort to when the going or navigational problem is particularly difficult. The responsibility for marking will be given to the force providing route. As artificial aids may not be correctly interpreted on may be displaced by accident or enemy action, guides may be used in addition or as an alternative. Additionally, if the enemy possesses image intensifiers, he will be able to pick up route marking lights.

139. **Marking the FUP and Start Line**. The need for security may preclude the use of an elaborate system for marking the FUP and start line for a night attack mounted outside the FEBA.

Instead, an easily recognizable check point will be chosen close to the FUP. If a natural easily identifiable feature does not exist, the check point should be marked by artificial means. From the check point, the assaulting troops are guided to their positions in the FUP or on the start line. Both the centre line of the FUP and the start line should normally be marked, by artificial means of necessary

THE APPROACH

140. **Protection**. The attacking troops need protection to their front, flanks and rear when moving outside the FEBA. This maybe provided by a screen of patrols protecting critical point on the flanks, though the main body is responsible for its own protection to the front and rear.

FORMATIONS

141. **Dismounted Infantry**. During the approach, dismounted infantry move in the appropriate tactical formation while allowing control to be maintained. For example, when conditions allow, sub-units may move on adjacent and parallel routes in single file. Infantry adopt their assault formation either in the FUP or closer to the objective, depending upon the distance between the start line and the objective, the visibility and the terrain.

142. **Tanks and APCs**. Tanks and APCs normally move in line ahead or staggered line ahead. In a mounted attack, tanks and APCs adopt assault formation, probably on the move, short of the objective, preferably when the commander of the assaulting force has been able to identify the objective.

FIGHTING THROUGH

143. The final assault and fighting through the objective are governed by the following considerations:

- a. The frontage and depth of the objective is less than in a day light attack.
- b. Troops advancing from the final assault position move directly towards the objective.
- c. Stealth and the minimum of noise is maintained for as long as possible even after surprise has been lost.
- d. Fighting through consists of a series of short range engagements, which are settled by quick shooting, the grenade and the charge. The use of image intensification weapon sights also permits GPMG groups to produce aimed covering fire.
- e. The use of night surveillance devices assists fighting through the objective, but enemy activity can often be detected by assaulting troops listening after each pocket of enemy resistance is overcome.



Annexes:

- A. Tanks in Support of a Dismounted Infantry Night Attack.
- B. Tanks in Support of an Infantry APC Night Attack.
- C. Dismounted Infantry Attack from Outside the FEBA.

RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 7
DATED JAN 23


TANKS IN SUPPORT OF A DISMOUNTED INFANTRY
NIGHT ATTACK




RESTRICTED

ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 7
DATED JAN 23

TANKS IN SUPPORT OF INFANTRY APC NIGHT ATTACK



DISMOUNTED INFANTRY ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE THE FEBA



POSITIONAL DEFENCE


INTRODUCTION

144. Defence is the most common activity in war. Whenever troops halt, they form some sort of defence even if it is only the placing of sentries. If troops are resting between battles, they invariably do within a defended area. A thorough knowledge of this subject is therefore required by all commanders.

AIM

145. The aim of this précis is to:

- a. Define defensive terminologies.
- b. Define the types and principles of defence.
- c. Outline the planning of a defensive battle.
- d. Out line the conduct of a defensive battle.



Layout the sequence of events in the occupation of a defensive position

DEFINITIONS

146. **Defended Post**. A position held by a small sub-unit e.g. an infantry section. Posts are grouped together in mutual support to form defended locality.

147. **Defended Locality**. An area of ground organized for all round defence by a platoon or company group.

148. **DefendedArea**. An area of operational responsibility containing group of localities organized in depth, e.g. a battalion area.

149. **Sectors**. A defensive position is divided into brigade and divisional sectors.

150. **Area of Responsibility**. The ground allotted to a unit or sub-unit on which it plans and fights its battle. It is designated on the ground by boundaries.

151. **Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA)**. The general line of own troops, excluding patrols, nearest to the enemy.

152. **Vital Grounds**. Ground, the capture of which by the enemy would render the defender incapable of fighting a successful battle. If there is a vital ground in the divisional sector, the commander must dispose his brigades to prevent the enemy from seizing it.

153. **Ground of Tactical Importance**. This is also referred to as important ground. It is that which is highly desirable, rather than essential to hold. It is however not abandoned lightly, rather steps are taken to recapture it by immediate counter-attack if it can be done without committing too much of there serve. This is usually done at bn level where a CO will normally select his own ground of tactical importance/important ground.

154. **Deliberate Defence (Positional)**. A deliberate defensive position is that one selected and prepared out of contact with the enemy. There should be time for detailed reconnaissance and planning on chosen ground and for construction and concealment of positions with the enemy ground interference.

155. **Hasty Defence (Mobile)**. In the worst case where a defence is built up under threat of, or in face of the enemy, it may not be possible to choose the best ground. Time is not available to properly plan, recon and construct the defensive position. Such a defence is hasty. It is often held during mobile operations, (advance or withdrawal).

156. **Deliberate Counter-Attack**. A planned and co-ordinated attack organized by a defender, usually by a formation commander, employing his reserves. It is normally launched after the situation has stabilized.

157. **Immediate Counter-Attack**. An attack organized by unit or possibly sub-unit commanders to destroy enemy forces which have penetrated or threatened to penetrate in to their defensive positions. It is normally timed to take place before the enemy can re-organize.

158. **Counter-Penetration**. The halting and containing of enemy forces which have penetrated or overrun forward defended localities. This may be undertaken by reserves or any force not committed. This can be referred to as "ANVIL and HAMMER" Operation i.e. contain and destroy the enemy.

159. **Covering Troops**. Covering troops are anybody or detachment of troops which provide security for a large force by observation, reconnaissance, attack or defence or by a combination of these methods.

160. **Covering Force**. Those covering troops established by the highest tactical commander to provide security for his force.

RESTRICTED

161. **Screen**. Covering troops deployed with the primary task of observing, identifying and reporting on enemy movement.

162. **Guard**. Covering troops deployed with the primary task of delaying the enemy of a specific period in addition to observing and reporting his movements.

163. A screen or guard maybe formed by a battalion group for its own warning and protection. It may be deployed to the front, to the flank or to be rear.

164. Screen tasks are best carried out by armed recce units—supported by mortars, artillery and engineers. While guards' tasks are best carried out by elements of infantry, arm our, artillery and engineers.

TYPES AND PRINCIPLES

165. There are 2 types of defence:
- a. Deliberate or positional.
 - b. Hasty or Mobile.

Defence varies between hasty defence, prepared when in contact with the enemy, and deliberate defence, prepared when out of contact with the enemy.

166. **Principles**. The basic principles of defence are:

- a. **Ground of Tactical Importance**. The defence must be denied to the enemy. To achieve this, localities are to be:
 - (1) Sited in depth.
 - (2) Organized for all round defence.
 - (3) Mutually supporting.
 - (4) Concealed.

RESTRICTED

- (5) Communication must be good.
- (6) Counter attack plans must be made.
- (7) Administration must be carefully planned.

b. **Depth.** Within their boundaries, battalions and companies must deploy their forces in-depth. This necessary to:

- (1) Block gaps between forward positions.
- (2) Surprise the attacker.
- (3) Absorb the enemy's penetration until it is destroyed by a counterattack.

c. **Mutual Support.** Sub-units must be capable of producing fire on the front, flank or rear of their neighboring sub-units. Areas of fire can be:

- (1) Overlapping; able to fire across the front of the mutually supporting unit, weapons.
- (2) Interlocking; able only to cross with the other sub-units weapon fire.
- (3) Tanks and anti-tank weapons must be sited so that they are mutually supported by at least one other source of anti-tank fire.
- (4) The minimum that should be accepted within a battalion group is:
 - (a) Between companies—GPMG(SP) overlap—GPMG interlock.
 - (b) Between platoons—GPMG overlap— SLR inter lock.
 - (c) Between sections—SLR overlap.

d. **All Round Defence.** A battle group commander must lay out his area to defeat attack from all likely enemy lines of approach. Sub-units must be prepared to fight in any direction in an emergency although they will normally concentrate on the most threat.

e. **Camouflage and Concealment.** A high degree of camouflage and concealment is necessary to maintain security of the position and surprise. This is achieved by:

(1) Concealment from air observation (when enemy has air superiority, there should be little movement or digging by day except under cover).

(2) Concealment from ground observation (once a post or weapon has been located, it can be destroyed by tanks, which are out of range of some infantry weapons, before the enemy launches his attack). A well hidden defended post has great advantages such as surprising the enemy by bring in gun expected fire on the enemy from an unexpected direction.

f. **Reserve.** Are serve is required to meet the unexpected, and for counter attack or counter penetration tasks.

g. **Administration.** Men must have the will to fight and to go on fighting. They must have in addition to good leadership, ammuniton, fire, food water, sleep and medical care.

PLANNING THE DEFENCE

167. With the principles of defence in mind, a commander will start to plan his defence. He will also consider certain factors:

- a. Ground, including approaches and obstacles. (It must be looked at from the enemy's point of view).
- b. Enemy, likely strengths and reactions.
- c. Availability of troops.
- d. Concealment.
- e. Time and space.
- f. Assessment of tasks.

RESTRICTED

168. Unless the enemy has no armour, (which is extremely unlikely), the defence must be based on the anti-tank plan. The anti-tank plan must include:

- a. Armour support.
- b. Mines and obstacles.
- c. All infantry anti-tank weapons.

169. **Obstacles**. Obstacles, which may be natural or artificial, are used to channel or 'concertina' the enemy into a pre-selected killing ground(s) where he may be destroyed. An obstacle must be covered by fire, preferably direct fire if possible. The aim is to prevent the enemy reconnoitering and crossing them unopposed. They are considered in relation to enemy likely approaches.

170. **Natural Obstacles**. The best and most economical obstacles are natural obstacles which can further be improved if time effort and stores are available. Gaps can be filled by mines or other suitable artificial obstacles.

171. **Artificial Obstacles**. Mines are the most commonly used artificial obstacles, although others such as ditches, barriers etc should not be disregarded.

172. **Demolitions**. The problems for an attacker can greatly be increased by the use of demolitions which may include in addition to bridges, culverts, etc, crating of roads, tree felling and any other means to restrict his ability to maneuver.

173. The RVs and movement of the company Recce group and orders group are ordered. The company commander can issue a preliminary order giving (if possible), the following in addition to para 32(a)above:

- a. Probable task(s).
- b. RV and time of move of main body.

RESTRICTED

c. Grouping.

174. **Receipt of Company Orders.** Company commanders send awarning order giving, (if possible):

- a. Outline tasks.
- b. Earliest time for move.
- c. RV and time for orders group.
- d. Grid reference of assembly area /RV for supporting units.
- e. Movement of echelons.
- f. Grouping including time and RV for new supporting units.
- g. Limitation son transport or reconnaissance.

175. The company commander then makes a map appreciation and reconnaissance with the commanders of the direct support battery and support in garmour. Other members of his orders group would be available. After his map appreciation, the commander may be able to allot tasks to members of his Recce group and arrange for later RVs. Are connaisance from the enemy's point of view should be made if possible.

176. **Issue of Orders.**

- a. Subordinate commanders and troops must be given as much time as possible for reconnaissance and preparation of the position.
- b. The issue of preliminary orders to allow commanders to start recce and planning with out knowing the detailed orders for a great deal of time. The orders should give:
 - (1) The situation and mission.
 - (2) The general out line.
 - (3) Grouping and tasks for each platoon and groups under command.

RESTRICTED

- (4) Sufficient co-ordinating instructions to allow the smooth occupation of the position.

177. **Occupation of the Position.** The sequence of occupation is at Annex A.

178. **Fire Plan.** A carefully coordinated fire plan involving not only artillery, but tanks and infantry weapons is the main means of weakening the enemy attack before and during the assault stage and destroying him during the counter-attack phase.

179. **Anti-Armour Defence.** The anti-armour defence is based on:

- a. The higher formation anti-armour plan designed to canalize and destroy attacking enemy armour (tanks).
- b. The local defence of battalion areas and company localities with battalion and company weapons.

CONDUCT OF THE DEFENCE

180. **General.** The conduct of the defence is best considered in four stages, as follows:

- a. The occupation of the position.
- b. The preparatory stage, before the enemy closes up to the position.
- c. The enemy assault.
- d. The counter-attack if and when the enemy assault has achieved some success but has been held.

OCCUPATION

181. After his troops are on the ground the commander can finally coordinate his defensive lay out. He must inspect and check:

RESTRICTED

- a. The section positions including the sitting of support weapons, the role and sitting of any tank in support, the sitting of surveillance warning devices, the GPMGs, are of responsibility, field of fire, trench construction and sentry plan.
- b. Artillery and mortar tasks, including where possible, their adjustment.
- c. Obstacles and their covering fire tasks.
- d. All administrative arrangement.
- e. Communications.

182. On occupying the position, orders on movement, camouflage, concealment etc must be given immediately and strictly enforced. This will demand a high standard of discipline. Commanders at all levels must ensure that the plan for the defence of the position as a whole, and of their locality in particular, is thoroughly understood by all ranks. Only by knowing what fire is available to break up an attack on his locality will the soldier have complete confidence in his ability to fight it out successfully.

183. **Preparation**. Through out this stage, work on improving and strengthening the positions will continue. At the same time, by the aggressive use of patrols, snipers and harassing fire:

- a. Morale will be maintained.
- b. The enemy will be prevented from reconnoitering the position.
- c. Enemy plans for attack will be disrupted.
- d. Information will be obtained of the enemy's intention.
- e. The commander will retain the initiative.

The Enemy Assault

184. The enemy may assault by day or by night. He may use stealth, smoke or a preliminary bombardment. Whatever his method and preliminary activities, observation posts, patrols and warning devices will disclose his intentions. His attack will then be broken up by:

RESTRICTED

- a. Artillery and mortar fire.
- b. Machine gun and anti-tank fire in conjunction with mines and wire.
- c. Small arms fire.
- d. Grenades and the bayonet used in that order as attack approaches the forward position.
- e. Fire control and fire discipline is of great importance in achieving the maximum effect from this defensive fire.

185. The soldiers must be instilled with a determination to standfast and fight it out at all cost. They must not leave their positions during an attack except:

- a. To engage the enemy in hand to hand fighting.
- b. To fill a gap in the all round defence.
- c. To make an immediate counter attack.
- d. Even if the enemy overruns some localities and penetrates in to the position, the remaining localities with their capability of all round defence must continue to hold out.

186. **The Counter Attack.** At the company level, it would be abnormal to have reserves of both infantry and tanks for counter attack. Any counter attack must be immediate and is based on the tanks available to the company's area and uses infantry who are holding out.

Annex:

- A. Sequence of Events (Occupation of Defensive Position).

**SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE OCCUPATION OF A
COMPANY DEFENSIVE POSITION**

Serial	Item	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)
1.	Warning Order received by Company Commander from Battalion Commander	
2.	Company Commander issues Warning Order to company Platoon Commanders ensure warning order is passed on to platoons.	
3.	Company R Group goes to RV for Preliminary Orders. R Group commanded by coy 2IC. Company Commanders receives Preliminary Orders from Battalion Commander.	
4.	Company O Group carries out reconnaissance. Company O Group arrives at RV specified by Company Commander in warning order.	
5.	Company Commander issue Preliminary Orders to Company O Group.	
6.	Company Commander takes Platoon Commanders round position and leaves them to reconnoiter their own positions.	
7.	Battalion Commander visits Company Adjustments are passed company position met by Company Commander who takes him round and makes necessary adjustments to company layout.	
8.	Platoon Commanders mark out slit trenches. Company Commander attends final. Company Commander issues final orders. Platoon Commanders make final corrections to positions.	
9.	Troops arrive on ground. Platoon Commander quickly give section commanders sufficient information to start men digging. Platoon Orders. Section orders on immediately to the Platoon Commanders Main Body arrives at debussing point and move into assembly are in rear of position.	
(a)	(b)	(c)
10.	Company Commanders orders forward main body to point where PI guides meet them and bring them up to position. Troops must wait in platoon RVs just short of the position whilst section commanders are given their instruction.	
11.	Platoon Commanders must check that orders have gone down to soldiers. This is the full sequence which can be abbreviated or telescoped or even extended to suit the time available. In most cases troops can start digging before final orders are given.	

WITHDRAWAL

INTRODUCTION

187. Withdrawal is one of the most difficult phases of war and withdrawal will only succeed if the commander formulates a simple plan, incorporating sound arrangement for control and ensures its dissemination to all ranks. The aim of the commander will be to withdraw intact out of contact and he will attempt a clean break. Frequently, it will be necessary to withdraw in contact on these occasions, control will be vital.

AIM

188. The aim of this précis is to describe the general principles and conduct of withdrawal with particular reference to a rifle company group.

REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL

189. Withdrawal may be undertaken for one or more of the following reasons:

- a. Following a defeat.
- b. To conform to movement of flanking units.
- c. To draw the enemy in to unfavourable position.
- d. To extend the enemy's line of communication.
- e. To avoid battle in unfavourable circumstances.
- f. To gain time without fighting a major battle.
- g. To allow the use of, or part of the forces elsewhere.
- h. For logistic reasons.

ROLES OF A WITHDRAWAL FORCE

190. A withdrawal group may be tasked to do the following:

- a. To prepare a new main position.
- b. To defend an intermediate position.
- c. To act as covering troop or screen for a new main

position.

- d. To act as demolition guards /rearguards.

COMMANDER'S AIM

191. The commander will aim to extricate his force, withdraw and occupy a new defensive position with the minimum of interference and casualties.

ENEMY AIR THREAT

192. The effect of enemy air operation on withdrawal may affect plans. If an enemy air threat exist, much of the major tactical and logistic movement may have to place at night.

ENEMY GROUND THREAT

193. On the ground the enemy may threaten:

- a. To overrun the withdrawing force in an attempt to turn the operation in to a route.
- b. To surround and destroy with drawing elements by infiltration, generation or by an outflanking movement.
- c. Toby-passsomeorallofthewithdrawingforce.

PRINCIPLES OF WITHDRAWAL

194. The principles of withdrawal are:

- a. Simplicity.
- b. Flexibility.
- c. Offensive action.
- d. Surprise
- e. Information.
- f. Morale.

g. Control.

195. **Simplicity**. The enemy will try to provoke chaos and confusion. He may very well succeed if plans are not simple and flexible.

196. **Flexibility**. All commanders must know the overall plan and be ready to act decisively to implement it in the face of confusion and disrupt communication. Orders must be simple.

197. **The unexpected will become the usual**. Accordingly, a commander must keep his force balance. He should always have "one leg on the ground", e.g. troops in rear defensive positions while forward troops withdraw; and maintain reserves to counter enemy penetration, infiltration or airborne landings.

198. **Offensive Action**. Commanders should seize opportunity to attack the enemy subject to the overall aim. Ambushes, quick counter-attacks, putting off maneuver and infiltration by patrols; all these can unbalance the enemy and gain time. The enemy will learn caution and the morale of our own troops will rise. It is extremely important that fire support is always available to the commander through out the withdrawal.

199. **Surprise**. Surprise in this case depends on secrecy. This will not be easy to achieve in the light of the overall strategic or tactical situation. Even so, a clear deception plan including perhaps a diversionary attack on a normal pattern of behaviour may help disguise short term intentions, e.g. the use of artillery may help to cover the noise of withdrawal and simulated preparations for an attack should cause the enemy to proceed with caution. Simulated radio traffic is another means of making the situation appear normal. The aim will be to control the withdrawal from the enemy until some hours after it has started. Knowledge of the plan beforehand must be restricted to those who need to know.

RESTRICTED

200. **Information.** Before the withdrawal intelligence effort should concentrate on discovering the enemy's capabilities and intentions. Air reconnaissance and stay behind parties will be of particular value once the withdrawal is under way.

201. **Morale.** Withdrawal imposes a greater strain on morale than any other operation of war. It must be sustained by leadership and discipline. The presence of commanders wherever situations are critical and their calm determination to make plans succeed in the midst of confusion will contribute greatly to steadiness and confidence in units. Once withdrawal begins troops must be told what is happening. This applies particularly to those in rear areas where rumours and garbled report will easily spread unless the staffs keep units briefed. The physical strain of withdrawing will be severe and key personnel must get proper rest if the operation extends over some days.

202. **Control.** Effective control will not be easy, particularly if distances are great. It must be maintained by:

- a. Clear orders.
- b. Key timing.
- c. Careful coordination of demolitions.
- d. Traffic control.
- e. Good communication.

PLANNING THE WITHDRAWAL

203. The factors to be considered while planning a withdrawal are:

- a. Orders from higher HQ.
- b. The distance between the present and the new main positions and the time needed for reconnaissance and preparation.
- c. The number of routes available and the frontage of the withdrawal. The way in which the intervening terrain can be use

RESTRICTED

to delay the enemy and inflict casualties.

- d. Ground conditions, weather and degree and duration of darkness.(Night withdrawal before full moon will help achieve secrecy and surprise and reduce casualties from air attack. In bad weather daylight withdrawal may be almost effective and it may also be the only way of maintaining control if the going is bad).
- e. Enemy ground strength.
- f. The situation on both flanks.
- g. The morale of the troops.
- h. The air situation.
- I. The logistic situation.

204. It is easier to withdraw if fresh troops are available to prepare the new main position. Troops already engaged can then concentrate on delaying the enemy from present or inter mediate positions. The following paragraphs assume that no fresh troops are available.

DESIGN FOR BATTLE

205. The intention will be to occupy and delay the enemy from one or more intermediate position while the new main position is prepared. Before abandoning the present position covering troops will deploy immediately behind it to fight a delaying action back to the intermediate position. This will allow time for the new main position to be prepared. When the prescribed delay has been achieved from the intermediate position the whole process is repeated. For each phase, a reserve will be required to meet any unexpected threat. The withdrawal concept is shown diagrammatically at Annex A.

206. In planning the withdrawal, you should ensure the following:
- a. The aim must be understood by the entire troops.
 - b. No forward position should be finally vacant until the next is partially manned.
 - c. Nonessential vehicles and equipment must be move

RESTRICTED

dearly to keep withdrawal route clear.

- d. Demolitions must be coordinated and clear orders issued on their control and protection.
- e. Grouping should remain unchanged throughout the withdrawal. (Any regrouping should take place in the new main position).
- f. Rearward movement should be across country or by support helicopters if available. (Obvious routes and defiles should be avoided).
- g. Traffic control must be carefully organized. (Reconnaissance sub-units are ideal for this task if the military police cannot cope.
- h. Reserves must be available.
- I. Good communications are vital. (The policy for electronic or radio silence must be clearly laid down).

KEY TIMINGS

- 207. The formation commander will always detail the following:
 - a. The time up to which the position is to be denied to the enemy.
 - b. The time before which there will be no rearward movement except for recce parties. These timings will depend on the strength required to hold the present position, the time needed to withdraw troops and the need for security and deception.
- 208. The formation commander may also specify some or all of the following timings though normally they are decided upon by battalion group commanders:
 - a. The time at which forward troops may start thinning out.
 - b. The time for final abandonment of the position.
 - c. The time by which all troops must be clear of the line behind the position to be abandoned. This will allow artillery

RESTRICTED

and air to engage enemy on the position.

OBSTACLES

209. Maximum use must be made of obstacles to slow up the enemy's advance. Their location may often dictate the selection of intermediate positions. Delay can be imposed by a combination of demolitions, mines and booby-traps which should be covered by fire or ambush. However, if this is impossible even mines and booby traps not covered by fire will slow the enemy down and make him mine conscious. Engineer efforts will be limited, however, directed primarily at major demolition tasks and improvement of natural obstacles particularly on the new main position. Local civilian resources should be commended and the machinery rendered useless after use. Village and other built-up areas should be turned into obstacles to movement.

ENGINEERS

210. The main engineer tasks are:

- a. Developing obstacle belts.
- b. Harassing the enemy with booby traps nuisance mines and delayed action charges.
- c. Hampering enemy logistics build up by destruction of ports, railways, bridges, pipelines and airfields.
- d. Destroying anything of value.
- e. Keeping open withdrawal routes.
- f. Preparing main and intermediate positions.

211. Engineering should be allotted in accordance with the following principles:

- a. Control should be exercised at the highest level.
- b. The sub-unit which prepares a demolition should fire it.
- c. Each operational commanders should be advised by

RESTRICTED

only one engineer.

- d. Engineers should be allotted to specified areas rather than to particular tasks over the whole zone.

THE BATTALION GROUP IN THE WITHDRAWAL ROLES

212. The battalion group may be given any one of the following roles in the withdrawal:

- a. Preparing and of occupying a new main defensive position or intermediate position.
- b. Acting as a covering force.
- c. Forming a reserve.
- d. Withdrawing from the present main position to an intermediate or new main position.

WITHDRAWAL BY NIGHT

213. By night thinning out starts from the rear, i.e. Depth company groups withdraw first. The aim is to achieve a withdrawal from contact and to conceal our intentions from the enemy until the last possible moment.

214. The withdrawal is carried out in 4 stages:

- a. Move of rear reconnaissance parties.
- b. Movement of company groups to Bn vehicle waiting area and ambushing point.
- c. Movement of company groups to the battalion group release point.
- d. Withdrawal to the new main or intermediate position.

SEQUENCE OF ACTION FOR WITHDRAWAL

215. **Move of Rear Recon Parties.** The rear reconnaissance party is commanded by the battalion group 2IC and include company 2ICs,

RESTRICTED

the battery captain and the 2IC of the armoured squadron, if applicable. Their task is to reconnoiter and plan the new main position. They carry out normal battle procedure. With reconnaissance and orders groups down to platoon level. Once detailed sittings have been decided, the reconnaissance party will mark weapons littrenches and command post positions. It is obviously desirable that the rear reconnaissance party reaches the new main position in day light. When the main body arrives it customary for seconds in command to exercise temporary tactical command until all commanders have familiarized themselves with the defensive lay out.

216. **Move of Company Groups to Vehicles Waiting Area.** A diagram illustrating this stage of the operation is at Annex B, which assumes vehicles are available. If not the battalion will still assemble the march. It should be referred to while reading what follows. Control is exercised by a system of check points at platoon, company and battalion group levels starting with the depth companies. Thinning out takes place as follows:

- a. **Foot Parties.** Platoons withdraw tactically and in turn to preselected check points/RVs some 200 metres to the rear of their defended localities. If possible, these RVs should be close to some easily identified land-mark. When every man is accounted for, platoons continue the withdrawal by carefully controlled routes to the company groups checkpoint. Again, every man is accounted for. In this case, however, platoons do not stop at the points but move on to another 200 metres or so to the company group RV. This prevents congestion at the check points. Once the company is complete, withdrawal continues to the battalion group checkpoint where the same procedure is followed. Eventually, therefore, the battalion group will have assembled at the battalion group RV some 200 metres in rear of the battalion group check point with every man on foot accounted for. From here company groups are called back to the vehicle waiting area where they ambush. Local defence of the battalion group RV and vehicle waiting area will be undertaken

RESTRICTED

by an appropriate force from a depth company group usually the first to arrive. They will be the last to ambush. The forward company groups will follow the same general procedure. In their case forward platoons will draw by sections from the rear, taking the greatest possible care not to alert the enemy.

b. **F Echelon Vehicles.** F Echelon vehicles should already be at the rear of company group defended localities before the withdrawal starts. They will move by a separate route either to the battalion group check point and thence to the vehicle waiting area, or direct to the vehicle waiting area. The latter method causes less congestion and will normally be used, in which case, vehicles report their arrival at the vehicle waiting area by radio to the battalion group check point. Once in the vehicle waiting area, vehicles are grouped with troop-carrying in to suitable packets. Vehicles noise at night can give the game away unless some sort of deception is practiced. One solution is to withdraw vehicles early; another is to create constant vehicles noise for some hours before the withdrawal and to leave 2 or 3 vehicles on the position until the very last moment. If a position has been occupied for a long time it may be possible to build up a pattern of vehicle movement noise over the previous 2 or 3 nights.

c. **Tanks.** Separate tank routes are reconnoitered from forward areas to the tank platoon and company check points of armoured waiting area. Clearly, these routes should not be used by vehicles or men on foot. If they do, special traffic control arrangement must be made or their moves must be separated by time. The tank company check points will usually withdraw by a separate route depending on the country and on the danger of enemy infiltration. Reliable radio within the tank company should reduce the need for physical checking at the check point.

217. **Move to Battalion Group Release Point.** This is a normal move by night, planned and controlled by Brigade HQ. Vehicles move in

RESTRICTED

tactically grouped packets when ordered by battalion group HQ. A Liaison Officer may have to be sent ahead to the check point of a reserved demolition (a bridge or a minefield gap) or to units through which the battalion group will pass. To avoid the possibility of enemy vehicles infiltrating by joining on the rear of vehicles packets, the LO must know how many packets are and what they should contain. Vehicle packets must move at best possible speed and should keep going at all cost if ambushed. The release point will be known by a nickname and the LO, as the last person through, should report when the battalion group is clear.

218. **Withdrawal to the New Main or Intermediate Position.**

This follows the usual procedure for occupation of a defensive position. Guides from the rear reconnaissance party meet packets at the battalion group release point.

219. **Timing.** The battalion group commander will base his timing on the following factors:

- a. The need to dispatch the rear reconnaissance parties as early as possible and certainly in daylight.
- b. The need to get rid of unnecessary vehicles and men as soon as possible.
- c. The noise deception plan, e.g. tanks either all withdraw early or a few might be left to simulate battlefield noise until the last moment.
- d. The time needed to thin out the battalion group and assemble it at the absolute minimum is the interval between final abandonment of forward positions and final withdrawal from the vehicle waiting area. It is then that the battalion group is most vulnerable to enemy follow up.

220. **Example.** In the following example, a battalion group commander receives orders at 0800 hours to deny his present position until 0100, with no rearward movement except for reconnaissance parties until last light (2000 hours):

RESTRICTED

- a. 1000 Rear reconnaissance parties move.
- b. 2000 All non-essential troops and vehicles withdraw.
- c. 2030 Armour withdrawal (deliberately early for deception).
- d. 2300 Depth company groups withdraw.
- e. 0100 Forward company groups withdraw.
- f. 1030 Position abandoned.
- g. 0145 Battalion group RV reports all correct.
- h. 0200 Battalion group clear of a given line in rear of the defensive position.
- i. Artillery cleared to engage targets.

WITHDRAWAL BY DAY

221. In day light it is much more difficult to achieve a clean break with the enemy and the operation is much more likely to be a withdrawal in contact than from contact. The principles employed is that one sub unit withdraws through another, either until contact is finally broken or until the intermediate or main defensive position is reached. Armour will play a vital role in holding the enemy off long enough to let infantry occupy a succession of temporary positions. Heavy fire support covering reserved demolition on natural and artificial obstacles will offer a further opportunity to break clean. The whole tempo of the operation will be much faster.

DIFFERENCES—DAY/NIGHT WITH DRAWAL

222. In this situation, the withdrawal procedure is modified as follows
- a. Forward company groups withdraw first through depth company groups.
 - b. Armour remains forward.
 - c. There will probably be no battalion group check point or RV. Company groups will pass through or near, rather than assemble at their respective RVs, reporting by radio as they do so.
 - d. Withdrawal most probably in contact.

FIRE SUPPORT

223. **Artillery.** Artillery tasks in a withdrawal are:

- a. Close DF, DF in depth and FPF for each intermediate position. These should be pre-planned and adjusted after occupation.
- b. DF tasks in support of covering troops.
- c. Planned concentrations on likely enemy axis of advance.
- d. Harassing fire.
- e. Covering force in support of counter attacks or to help troops disengage.
- f. Smoke to cover withdrawal.
- g. Deception or diversionary fire, e.g. to cover vehicle noises at night.
- h. Battle field illumination.

224. **Mortars.** The mortar platoon normally remains inaction until the last possible moment. Movement will be by section to provide continuous support.

Annexes:

- A. Diagrammatic Concept of With drawal.
- B. Battalion Group With drawal.

CHAPTER 2

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

225. There are 10 principles of war that have emerged from experience and the study of the elements of success throughout the history of warfare. The principles are applicable to all types of operations and in all phases of war. When properly applied, they will assist commanders to achieve their missions.

OBJECTIVES:

226. At the end of this lecture, students will be able to:
- a. State the 10 principles of war.
 - b. Know that the proper application of the principles is essential to the exercise of command and the conduct of military operation.
 - c. Know that each principle must be considered and appropriately applied during the planning and conduct of all tactical operations.
 - d. Know that the correct application of these principles will depend on sound understanding, common sense and judgement which is the hallmark of a successful military commander.
227. The 10 principles of war are:
- a. Selection and maintenance of the aim.
 - b. Maintenance of Morale.
 - c. Offensive action.
 - d. Surprise.
 - e. Security.
 - f. Economy of effort.
 - g. Flexibility.
 - h. Concentration of force.

RESTRICTED

- i. Cooperation.
- j. Administration.

228. The principles could be summed up by the acronym FOAM ACCESS. These principles are explained briefly below:

SELECTION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM

229. In the conduct of war as a whole, and in every military operation, it is essential to select and define the aim clearly. The ultimate aim may be to break the enemy's will to fight, although in certain circumstance, it may be, more circumscribed by political considerations and thus be more limited. Whatever the ultimate aim, each phase of the operation to achieve the final result must have a more limited aim of its own. Operations and circumstance vary so greatly that a commander may have wide variety of possible aims depending on the political background, relative strengths and the terrain. The selection of the immediate aim is therefore one of commander's most important duties, and it demands clear and logical thought. There must be no doubt about what the military force is trying to achieve. The aim must be that which is practicable with the forces available to the commander.

MAINTENANCE OF MORALE

230. Success in war depends on as much morale as on material qualities. Morale is probably the most important single factor. A high morale in troops fosters the offensive spirit. Although morale is primarily a mental state, it is very sensitive to material conditions. A high morale is based on a clear understanding of the aim, on discipline and self respect, on confidence in training and weapons, on sound administration and above all, on confidence in the leadership right through the chain of command. The surest way to achieve this confidence is by success in battle.

OFFENSIVE ACTION

231. The principle of offensive action is based on a state of mind which breeds the determination to gain and retain the initiative and seize or make opportunities to harass and inflict damages on the enemy. It does not mean the stupid or discriminate attacking of enemy. No campaign or operation (even when defensive in nature) will achieve its aim unless there are some degree of offensive actions to establish supremacy over the enemy. Offensive action is a contributory factor to the development of high moral.

SURPRISE

232. Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence in the use of force and its effect on morale can be very great. It gives the force initiative, threatens enemy morale, reduces own casualties and often, the material advantages consistent with a superior concentration of force. When other factors are unfavourable, success may depend almost entirely on surprise. Surprise can be achieved strategically or tactically by an indirect approach or by exploiting new materials and techniques. Its elements are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality audacity and speed.

SECURITY

233. Every military operation requires a high degree of security which will enable own forces to operate effectively. This involves defence of vulnerable bases and entry points, the gaining of a satisfactory air situation, the guarding of flanks in order to gain freedom of action, and the denial of information on own forces and intentions to the enemy. It also involves the holding of sufficient reserves. Security does not mean undue caution at the expense of offensive action, instead, it increases the chances of success. An important part of strategy and also tactics is to strike the right balance between security and offensive action, allotting the proper proportion of resources to each.

ECONOMY OF EFFORT

234. Economy of effort is closely related to both the principles of security and concentration of forces. It is not possible to be strong everywhere always if decisive strength is to be concentrated any turn of events. A force must be flexible to enable it to react to a change of plan and switch smoothly from one course of action to another. This involves good training, organization, communications and staff work and the maintenance of reserve. It also calls for physical mobility of a high order so that new dispositions and groupings can be adopted rapidly and economically. Above all, it demands flexibility of the mind and fast decision making on the part of commander's right down to the lowest level.

CONCENTRATION OF FORCE

235. Military success will normally result from the concentration of a superior force at the decisive time and place, whether it be morale or material or a combination of both. Concentration of force does not mean that there should not be dispersion. Dispersion of troops and fire power will be available if the enemy is to be misled and own force is to be properly deployed especially after a speedy concentration has achieved its aim, particularly, in a nuclear operation. Concentration of force and dispersion are a question of timing and judging through experience. The application of this principle therefore is dependent on being properly balanced and having good communication so that movement and time can be done with skilful judgment.

COOPERATION

236. Military operations involve cooperation between all arms and services in the army, between the army, navy and air force, between the armed forces and civil authorities between allied forces, and between all allies. It is based on team spirit and entails the coordination of all activities so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the

whole. Effective cooperation can only be achieved if goodwill and the desire to work in operation exist at all levels. Under certain circumstances and for a specific task. One service must be prepared to place itself under operational control of another service even at a very low level.

ADMINISTRATION

237. No operational plan is likely to succeed unless great care is devoted to the administrative arrangements for putting it into effect. Such plans should be flexible to allow for the unforeseen, and designed to give the commander the maximum freedom of action in carrying out his plan. The art of administration lies not in over-ensuring and possessing large stocks of all requirements at all times, but in making the best use of limited resources, improvising and taking calculated risks where necessary, and being determined to overcome all obstacles. The administrative organization must be made as simple as possible. An operational commander must have a clear understanding of the administrative factors which may affect its activities and he must have that degree of control over the administrative plan. Without sound administration, morale will suffer.

SUMMARY

238. The ten principles of war for application in all war situations should be remembered easily with the acronym – FOAM-ACCESS A - Aim-Selection and Maintenance. M - Morale. O - Offensive action. S - Surprise. S - Security. E - Economy of effort. F - Flexibility. C - Concentration of force. C - Cooperation. A - Administration. The strict or blind adherence to all principles is not advised, but only to serve as a warning that the non-consideration of any of them could be disastrous as the enemy may well take the advantage

CHAPTER 3

FIGHTING IN BUILT UP AREA (FIBUA) INTRODUCTION

239. FIBUA is an operation carried out in Built Up Areas with highly populated and large concentration of buildings and infrastructures. FIBUA can come up in two different ways:

- a. As a result of normal conventional warfare.
- b. As a result, of terrorist activities.

SCOPE

240. In treating this topic, the following areas shall be discussed:

- a. Characteristics of FIBUA.
- b. types of operations in FIBUA.
- c. Principles of FIBUA.
- d. Ways of dealing with FIBUA.
- e. Control measures in FIBUA.
- f. Source of information in FIBUA.
- g. Equipment and weapons used in FIBUA.
- h. Conclusion.

CHARATERISTICS OF FIBUA

241. The following are characteristics of fighting in Built Up Areas;

- a. Limited observation.
- b. Limited field of fire.
- c. Difficult in Command and Control.
- d. Close mutual support is difficult.
- e. Fighting is at close quarter.
- f. Difficult in communication.

RESTRICTED

- g. Restricted use of support weapons.
- h. Possibility of bypassing or being bypassed.
- i. Huge number of men is required in FIBUA.
- j. Movement of vehicles is restricted and could be canalize.

TYPES OF OPERATIONS IN FIBUA

242. a. **Offensive Operations.**

- (1) Raid.
- (2) Ambush.
- (3) Attacking Terrorist Camp.
- (4) Cordon and Search.

b. **Defensive Operation.**

- (1) Road block.
- (2) KP & VPs duties.
- (3) Escort duties etc.

PRINCIPLES OF FIBUA

- 243. a. Simple planning.
- b. Command and Control.
- c. Thoroughness.
- d. Cover, camouflage and concealment.
- e. Fire control and discipline.
- f. Movement.
- g. Effective communication.
- h. Momentum.
- i. Covering fire.

WAYS OF DEALING WITH FIBUA

- 244. a. Normal ground attack.
- b. Chemical attack.

RESTRICTED

- c. Destruction by bombardment.
- d. Cordon and search.
- e. Search and destroy operations.

CONTROL MEASURES IN FIBUA

- 245.
- a. Ground divided into sectors.
 - b. Movement in bounds and report lines.
 - c. Areas divided into boundaries and arc of fire.
 - d. Nick names, code words and pass word should be use.
 - e. Grouping in buddies and assault teams.
 - f. Use of alternative RVs.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN FIBUA

- 246.
- a. Normal Intelligence sources.
 - b. From the locals.
 - c. Air photograph.
 - d. Town planning maps.
 - e. Patrol reports.
 - f. Prisoners of war.
 - g. Refugees.
 - h. Deserters.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT USE IN FIBUA

- 247.
- a. Weapons – PI wpns, explosives, knives etc.
 - b. Equipment – Binoculars, first aid kits, map reading equipment, toggle rope, commando saw etc.

CONCLUSION

248. With the evolving of threats to national security and the activities of terrorist organization in urbanized region, the training on FIBUA is so important and could not be neglected. The above

RESTRICTED

discussions are to be view with all seriousness in order to have combat ready troops to deal with urbanized threats.

CHAPTER 4

CROWD DISPERSAL

249. The aim of crowd dispersal is to prevent a crowd from assembling or re-assembling. A peaceful gathering can turn violent if the leader of the crowd loses control and hooligans and hoodlums take over. The speed at which the troops arrive at the scene of a disturbance may prevent the deterioration of the situation.

250. The handling of a crowd can be through non-violent or violent method:

a. **Non-Violent Method.** The non-violent method involves oral persuasion, warning of the crowd through the reading of the Riot Act and advancing in strength by the troops towards the crowd as a show of force. The use of box formation, which provides all round protection, is a technique that is still useful while dispersing low-key protesters. Current realities also require that troops maintain reasonable distance from the crowd at all time as defence against suicide person borne attacks.

b. **Violent Method.** A more violent and riotous crowd would attract the use of Tear Gas/CS riot control agent as a prelude to opening fire. Before ordering troops to open fire, the military commander should take the following action:

- (1) Warn the crowd (as mentioned above).
- (2) Indicate particular target to the troops.
- (3) Conceal the identity of the marksman by ordering the whole section to take aim.
- (4) Obtain evidence to complete the diary of events including collecting and counting empty cartridges.

RESTRICTED

251. **Opening of Fire.** Further warning of the intention to open fire is not necessary if the following circumstances exist:

- a. Casualty has been recorded and lives are in danger.
- b. While defending a person under attack and there is no other way to save his life.
- c. As the last option to re-arrest a person who escapes from lawful custody for felony.
- d. As the last option to arrest a person whose offence carries a penalty of 7 years imprisonment or death.

VULNERABLE POINT GUARD

252. The tasks of Vulnerable Points (VP) guard are to prevent damages, arson or looting and to ensure the maintenance of essential services and utilities. Troops assigned to VPs are to remain at their duty post and should not be called upon to assist elsewhere.

253. A VP guard should not be less than a section and should be commanded by an NCO of the rank of a corporal. The guard commander must be given clear and explicit written orders covering the following:

- a. Task.
- b. Description of the VP and liaison arrangement with the police and the workers within the VP.
- c. Location of entrances and installation to be guarded or visited by patrols.
- d. Action on code words.
- e. Action when VP is approached by unauthorized persons.
- f. Action when VP is in danger of damage, looting or arson.
- g. Circumstances in which fire may be opened.
- h. Arrangement for reinforcement.
- i. Communication.

254. The orders for the sentries at VP guard should include the

RESTRICTED

following:

- a. The scale of ammunition to be carried, charging of magazines, loading, position of safety catch/lever.
- b. Challenging.
- c. Action when approached by unauthorized persons.
- d. Action when VP is in danger of damage, looting and arson.
- e. Opening fire.
- f. Checking of passes against specimen issued.
- g. Means of identification of workers.

256. It would be reasonable for troops on VP guard, when persuasion fails, to shoot and protect themselves, other servicemen or others whom it is their duty to protect from immediate threat of death or actions that may result to serious bodily injuries. They could also open fire to protect the VP from forcible crime, which could result in serious damage to property.

CHAPTER 5

CORDON AND SEARCH

257. Cordon and search is a combined police and military operation. It is organized, based on good intelligence and should be pre-planned in detail and rehearsed. While the police may control a small search, the NA should control a search involving a battalion or more.

258. Every soldier taking part in a cordon and search must be clearly briefed about his responsibilities and methods of approach. Troops for cordon and search are organized into parties as follows:

- a. Cordon troops who surround the area to be searched.
- b. Outer cordon troops who are deployed to cover likely approaches, some distance away to prevent interference from outside the isolated area.
- c. Search parties that carry out the search of houses and inhabitants.
- d. Cage troops who erect and guard cages for holding persons awaiting interrogations.
- e. Escort troops who escort wanted persons to a place of detention after interrogation.
- f. Road block troops who stop and prevent traffic trying to enter the isolated area.
- g. A reserve of troops that may be required to deal with the unexpected.

CHAPTER 6

ROAD BLOCKS

259. During IS operations roadblocks, deliberate or snap, are set up for the following reasons:

- a. Maintain continuous check on road movement.
- b. Apprehend wanted persons and couriers.
- c. Prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunitions.

260. Although roadblocks cause inconveniences and even fear, citizens should be made to understand their utility and preventive nature. Every person manning a roadblock must know his job thoroughly and act quickly and methodically to prevent delay to legitimate traffic. Troops should show politeness and consideration at all times, and wanton damage to vehicles and property should never be tolerated. As much as possible, at least two soldiers knowledgeable in searching vehicles and persons should always be employed. Provision must also be made for female searchers. Roadblocks should not be in place for too long, otherwise the usefulness may be lost. Procedures for searching cars, buses, goods vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles are at Annex A.

261. **Convoy and Road Protection.** The organization of convoys and arrangement for adequate road protection is a staff responsibility. However, the most avoidable casualties are those caused by the insurgents by snipping and ambushing road convoys. All movement of mechanical transport must be regulated by convoys, adequately protected. The road communication should be divided into sectors, each with a controlling headquarters to ensure arrangements are made for timings, composition, command, communication and escort. Formations made responsible for running convoys must produce standing orders for convoys, escorts and road opening posts.

CONVOY DRILLS

262. **TYPES OF CONVOY**

- a. Packet System.
- b. Convoy System.
- c. Capacity System.

263. **OFFICIALS IN CONVOY MOVEMENT**

- a. Vehicle leader.
- b. Dispatch Rider.
- c. Offr in charge of head of column.
- d. Offr in charge of tail of column.

264. **OTHERS**

- e. Section comd.
- f. Column comd.
- g. Convoy comd.

265. **PRINCIPLES OF CONVOY MOVEMENT**

- a. Recce of routes.
- b. Control.
- c. Communication.
- d. Good administration.
- e. Organization of convoys into various groups.

266. **CONTROL MEASURES**

- a. **START POINT.** A clearly defined point on a route at which mov becomes controlled by the fmn comd ordering the mov.
- b. **RELEASE POINT.** A clearly defined point on the route at which various elements of the convoy reverts to the comd of their respective comds.
- c. **CRITICAL POINT.** These are selected points on the route for references when giving instructions. It includes SP and

RESTRICTED

release points.

- d. **DUE**. The time the head of column is expected to arrive at a specific critical point.
- e. **CLEAR**. The time the tail of a column passes or is scheduled to pass a specific critical point.
- f. **TRAFFIC DENSITY**. This is the average number of vehicles that occupy one km of a road space.
- g. **FLOW**. Average speed (Day and night).

267. **FACTOR AFFECTING PLANNING OF CONVOY MOV**

- a. Type of movement.
- b. Method of movement.
- c. Length of column.
- d. Traffic control.
- e. Flow of traffic.
- f. Vehicle density.
- g. Average speed.
- h. Timing including SP.
- i. Time to complete mov.
- j. Regulating HQ set up.
- k. Speculations of harbour area.
- l. Enemy interference.
- m. Security.
- n. Weather.

268. **ADMIN SUPPORT TO CONVOY**

- a. Medical.
- b. Air cover.
- c. Maintenance and Recovery.
- d. MP/Civil Police.

269. **CONTENTS OF CONVOY MOV ORDERS**

- a. Composition and order of march.
- b. Route or routes include details of how they are marked.

RESTRICTED

- c. Traffic density and method of mov.
- d. Average speed.
- e. Timings.
- f. Critical points include Start and Release points.
- g. Halts.
- h. Recovery.
- i. Traffic control.
- j. Report lines.
- k. March discipline to include:
 - (1) Maintenance of correct speed and distance.
 - (2) Response to all signal and orders.
 - (3) Observation of traffic regulations.
 - (4) Dispersion.
 - (5) Camouflage.
 - (6) Prompt relay of orders.
 - (7) Camouflage.

GUARDING OF IMPORTANT PERSONS

270. In IS operations troops may have to undertake the protection of Very Important Personalities (VIP) whose death or injury could have adverse repercussions or be of tremendous propaganda value to the insurgents' cause.

271. If a VIP has to travel by road, he should be provided with a full escort divided into a vanguard, close escort and rear guard. Communication with the operational base and group inter-link should be provided. Other measures that may be considered for VIP protection include the following:

- a. Provision of armoured protection to the VIP.
- b. Removal of any distinguishing/identifying marks on the person and vehicle of the VIP.
- c. Getting the vehicle of the VIP out of danger by the close escort in the event of attack.
- d. Provision of air cover and making dummy and live runs along the route against ambush positions.

RESTRICTED

- e. Secrecy about the details of the movement for as long as possible.
- f. Publicity for the visit on the departure of the VIP as a propaganda stunt.

GUARDING OF KPs AND VPs

272. **Key Point.** A key point is an installation, the product or services of which are of such importance that total loss or severe damage would critically impair the security and functioning of government.

273. **Vulnerable Point.** Any point vulnerable to sabotage or connected with a key point where destruction or serious damage would result in unacceptable interruption of the key point services or loss of products.

274. **RESPONSIBILITY OF GUARDING CIVIL INSTALLATION**

a. The responsibilities of guarding all civil installations rest on the civil police. Military assistance may however be required for any of the following:

- (1) To free the police for other tasks which are more suitably performed by them than the military.
- (2) To supplement the police if the latter becomes unduly stretched.
- (3) To supplement or take over from the police if the weapon techniques required which only the military can supply.

b. **Forms of Attack.** There are 2 forms of attack:

- (1) Attack from Outside. Standoff attacks using mortars, rockets and guns.
- (2) Attack from Inside. These come in 2 basic forms:

(a) **Covert Intrusion.** For example;

- i. Passing as authorized person

RESTRICTED

within.

- ii. Subversive element.
- iii. Getting into the perimeter defence by stealth.

(b) **Overt Intrusion**. A well-planned raid designed to prevent the defence.

275. **TASK OF A VP GUARD**

- a. Detect and deter and destroy any one trying to gain info about the KPs or VPs.
- b. Prevent arson, damage and looting.
- c. Ensure maintenance of essential services.

276. **The Contents of the Guard Comd's Orders incl:**

- a. Task.
- b. Description of the VP and liaison arrangement with the Civ Police and the workers within the VP.
- c. Loc of entrances and installation to be guarded or visited by patrols.
- d. Action on code words.
- e. Action when VP is approached by unauthorized persons.
- f. Action when VP is in danger of damage, looting or arson.
- g. Circumstances in which fire may be opened.
- h. Arrangement for reinforcement.
- i. Communication.
- j. Concise instructions on the circumstances in which fire may be open.
- k. Availability of reinforcement if needed.
- l. List of authorized employees and visitors.
- m. Instructions for searching men and women.
- n. Numbers of entrance and out of the KP/VP.
- o. Admin to cover ammo, rest, feeding, medicals etc.

277. **SENTRY ORDERS AT KP OR VP**

- a. Scale of ammo to be carried, charging of magazine and position of safety catch.
- b. Challenge.
- c. Action when approached by unauthorized personnel.
- d. Action when VP is in danger of damage, looting or arson.
- e. Opening fire.
- f. Checking of passes – specimen should be used.
- g. Means of identifying workers.

CHAPTER 7

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES

278. Peace Support Operation (PSO) has been described as a third party approach to conflict resolution. This type of operation is usually carried out after a detailed consultation with the warring parties and mutual agreement to a cease-fire. It is different from peace enforcement, which usually aims at forcing the belligerents to accept terms stipulated by the United Nations or the international community when all efforts at reaching an agreement for a cease-fire have failed.

279. The objective of this chapter is to provide students an understanding of the requirement for preparation, training and conduct of troops before and during the duration of stay in a PSO environment.

CONCEPTS

280. The scope of modern PSO has expanded in dimension and intensity to necessitate the development of new concepts and strategies for dealing with unfolding challenges. Seven concepts form the basis of contemporary PSO. These are:

a. **Preventive Diplomacy.** Preventive Diplomacy refers to all action taken to prevent disputes from developing between parties or preventing existing disputes from escalating into conflicts. It limits the spread of conflict when they occur.

b. **Peace Making.** Peace Making is diplomatic action taken to bring hostile parties into negotiated agreements through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (UNC).

c. **Peacekeeping.** Peacekeeping refer to operations generally undertaken under the auspices of UN/AU/ECOWAS and other regional bodies in the field (normally involving military and civilian components), with the consent of the parties to the conflict. It is

RESTRICTED

designed to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fire, separation of f o r c e s , etc.) and their resolution. It further allows for the safe delivery of humanitarian aids.

d. **Peace Enforcement.** Peace enforcement may be needed when all other efforts fail. The authority for enforcement is vested on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as enshrined in Chapter VII of the UNC. It allows for the use of armed forces to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the UNSC has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.

e. **Peace Building.** Peace building cover all actions in the identification and use of structures, institutions or facilities including support measures to promote peace, build trust and interaction among former parties to the conflict with object of avoiding a relapse into conflict.

f. **Sanctions.** Sanctions cover the application of measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. The purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or otherwise exert retribution.

g. **Disarmament.** Disarmament entails the assembly, control and disposal of weapons from parties to a conflict. Micro-disarmament is the practical disarmament in the context of the conflicts the UN or regional organization is dealing with relevant to post-conflict peace building.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACEKEEPING

281. Peacekeeping is premised on certain fundamentals. These are:

a. **Legitimacy.** A peacekeeping mission derives its legitimacy from its mandate, international support, adherence to statutory laws and conventions and the credibility of the forces.

b. **Consent.** UN and regional peacekeeping

RESTRICTED

operations are established with the consent and co-operation of the parties to a conflict. Unlike peacekeeping, peace enforcement may not require the consent of all parties to the conflict.

c. **Impartiality.** A peacekeeping force must be impartial in character. The force cannot take sides without becoming party to the conflict it has been mandated to contain and resolve.

d. **Use of Minimum Force.** In peacekeeping operations, force will not be used to carry out the mandate except where absolutely necessary. Even then, only the minimum force required for meeting specific objective is to be applied. However, use of Minimum Force does not exclude self-defence of mission personnel and property. The use of force would be clearly defined in the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

e. **Credibility.** The credibility of peacekeeping operation is the confirmation of its ability to accomplish its mandate. To effectively carry out its mandate and earn the confidence of the parties, a peacekeeping force must be composed of trained personnel who are well equipped and possess high professional standards.

f. **Negotiation and Mediation.** Negotiation and mediation refer to the dialogue between parties to the conflict and mutual decisions reached under the guidance of a mediating agency. The processes may be cumbersome but have enormous potential to de-escalate a conflict, promote a secure environment and develop peaceful and lasting solutions among warring parties.

TYPES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

282. Depending on political, geographical, economic or religious circumstances and considerations, PSO could be inunciated under the following arrangements:

a. **Bilateral.** This is between two countries that have a

RESTRICTED

previous mutual defence pact that covers such operations or a direct request of one government to another e.g. Nigeria's participation in Tanzania in 1964 and Senegals' participation in Gambia in 1981.

- b. **Sub-regional.** eg ECOMOG.
- c. **Regional/Continental.**AU peace missions - NATO peace missions.
- d. **Global.** UN peace missions.

COMPOSITION OF PSO

283. The composition of PSO forces and their tasks depends on the nature and intensity of conflict, the political agreement established between the mediating agency and parties to the conflict. It may involve considerations concerning the following subjects:

- a. **Diplomatic ic/ Political Officers and Staff .** Diplomatic/political officers and staff are saddled with tasks ranging from political negotiation to supervising, monitoring and direct control of administrative bodies and offices.
- b. **Human Rights Component.**The human rights component undertakes human rights activities such as monitoring the observance of human rights, fundamental freedoms and violations, the prevention of human rights abuses as well as the development and implementation of human rights education programmes.
- c. **Civil Administration Component.** T h e c i v i l administration component monitors, supervises or has direct control of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information.
- d. **Electoral Component.** The electoral component undertakes such tasks as organisation and supervision of free and fair elections or referendums.
- e. **Repatriation Component.** Repatriation component takes care of refugees, Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs), political prisoners and other detainees. The component

RESTRICTED

organizes resettlement processes. This may also involve rehabilitation covering the immediate needs and laying the groundwork for future plans.

f. **CIVPOL Component.** The Civil Police (CIVPOL) component undertakes the training, supervision and/or control of local civil police in order to maintain law and order effectively and impartially. They take interest in respect for fundamental human rights in PSO environment.

g. **Border Monitors.** Border monitors are to monitor embargo imposed and report violations along international borders or any other local area in case of intra-state conflict. International staff and field service components are the administrative, financial, communications, logistics and security backbone of any field operations. They usually fall under the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO).

h. **Military Component.** The tasks of the military component can generally be summarized as the separation of warring parties, establishment of a buffer zone or its equivalent, supervision of truce or cease-fire agreement and prevention of armed conflict between or within nations. In addition, military components contribute to the maintenance of law and order and the eventual return to normalcy.

PREPARATION FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

284. Preparations for PSO takes place concurrently at different levels of the military command once a country is intimated to mobilize troops for mission. These levels and their respective activities include:

- a. Action by Higher HQ:
 - (1) Early warning to units earmarked for the operation.
 - (2) Designates training area for the units.
 - (3) Provision of detailed up-to-date information.
 - (4) Provision of equipment.
 - (a) Personal weapons.
 - (b) Mine detectors.

RESTRICTED

- (c) Night Vision Aids.
- (d) Sp Wpns.
- (e) LLAD.
- (f) Vehs (A&B, Comd Vehs, Amb, Sig FFR etc).
- (5) Funds.
- (6) Logistics.
- b. Action by Units:
 - (1) **Training.** The main preoccupation of a unit earmarked for peace-keeping operation is training. The training must be comprehensive and should include:
 - (a) Geo-politics of the area of conflicts.
 - (b) Studying the contents of the SOFA.
 - (c) Language and culture of the people.
Computer literacy.
 - (d) Emplaning and deplaning drills.
 - (e) Comms.
 - (f) Driving - This is mandatory for UN Military Observers.
 - (g) Map Reading.
 - (h) Convoy movement with emphasis on escort duties.
 - (i) Roadblock.
 - (j) Cordon and Search.
 - (k) Ambushes.
 - (l) Patrolling (Day and Night).
 - (m) First Aid.
 - (n) Public relations.
 - (o) Wpns skill.
 - (p) Physical Trg.

- (2) **Information.** The CO of a unit earmarked for PSO must be provided with all relevant information, which he, in turn, will disseminate to all troops participating in the operation, irrespective of rank. This

RESTRICTED

should include:

- (a) UN mandate for the operation.
 - (b) Background to the crisis.
 - (c) Present situation.
 - (d) Geography of the region.
 - (e) History.
 - (f) Government and people of the area, with emphasis on tradition, customs and religion.
 - (h) Information on the Armed Forces; to include size, command structure, equipment and tactics.
 - (i) Information on other belligerents to cover identification, Comd structure, leaders, habits etc.
 - (j) Terrain and weather.
 - (k) Health problem prevalent in the region.
 - (l) Profile of the UN Force Commander.
 - (m) Other troop contributing countries.
 - (n) Status of Forces Agreement.
 - (o) Diet and food available in the region.
 - (p) Own country's position or interest in the conflict.
 - (q) Dos and Don'ts (Especially in UN operations).
 - (r) Allowances and other entitlement.
- (3) **Documentation**. This will include dog tags.
- (4) **Medical Examinations**. This will include inoculation.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

285. **A MOU is like a contract.** It contains details of the personnel, major equipment, and self-sustainment services that the contributing country will provide, including the reimbursement rates that will apply, which are clearly laid out in tables of the COE Manual. The UN

RESTRICTED

authorities and the contributing country representatives (including senior logistics personnel) will negotiate a written formal agreement between the UN and the Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) that clearly establishes the responsibilities and standards for the provision of personnel, major equipment, and self-sustainment support services for both the UN and the contributing country. It will be signed by representatives from Department of Operational Support (DOS) and the contributing country's Permanent Mission to the UN and will remain in force until the end of the mandate of the peacekeeping operation when the formed military returns from the mission area, or until both parties mutually agree that the MOU requires adjustment and/or renegotiation. Therefore, commanders of TCC units must always endeavour to acquaint themselves with the document as it guides on the level of equipment and support available to them.

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

286. **Definition.** Taking into consideration the fact that PSO is a third party approach to conflict resolution, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) could be defined as a legally binding document normally prepared for the regulation of the conduct of all parties involved in a conflict in which foreign troops are brought into another sovereign state to assist in restoration of peace and security. It forms the basis for the type of relationship between the peace-keepers and the warring factions or government of the state and it clearly defines the role, powers, limitations and the level of immunity to be given to the foreign troops.

287. **Origin.** Article 105 of the UN Charter provides that the UN "shall enjoy in the territory of each members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes" and similar privileges for representatives of the UN "as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions". The convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 Feb 1964, was the result of the General Assembly's efforts to detail the general protection afforded by Article 105. Whenever it becomes necessary for the UN to deploy forces

RESTRICTED

into a receiving state for an operation, the status of the UN or multinational forces usually depends on the underlying authority upon which the forces are present in the receiving state. If the presence of the UN or multinational forces in the territory of a sovereign state occurs under the coercive authority of the Security Council, then absolute immunity from any receiving state authority exists and may be asserted. However, despite the fact that the Security Council has the authority to specify the status of a force that is deployed under its authority, as well as the status of the members of that force, it has always been desirable to provide for the status of the force by agreement with the receiving state.

288. **Agreements.** Whenever the deployment of UN or multinational forces in a sovereign state becomes necessary, various agreements are entered into. These could basically be grouped into 4 types:

- a. Basic Agreement.
- b. Detailed Status of Forces Agreement.
- c. Agreement for Transit Rights.
- d. Agreement for Permanent Bases.

You are to note that Basic Agreement may not be necessary a written docus. It only paves way for further UN actions as it may not be more than mere acceptance of a UN Resolution by the State concerned.

289. **Contents.** A SOFA will contain/include the following:

- a. The International Status of the Forces and its members.
- b. Entry and departure permits.
- c. The right to carry arms (incl orders for opening fire).
- d. Freedom of movement of individual members of the force in host country.
- e. Use of roads, waterways, port facilities and airfields.
- f. The right to operate its own communications system incl FM radio stations.
- g. Postal regulations.
- h. The flying of UN and national Flags.

RESTRICTED

- i. Uniform regulations.
- j. Permission to operate UN vehicles without special registration.
- k. Applicability of "The convention of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations".
- l. Jurisdiction regulations.
- m. Tax and duty regulations (incl Duty Free Shops and non-dutiable commodities.
- n. General supply and maintenance matters (Import of equipment, commodities, local procurement of provisions, petrol, oil and lubricants) and custom duties regulations for the UN Forces.
- o. Compensation regulations (as it affects host country's property).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

300. ROE are set of rules established for every PSO, guiding the use of force/weapons and the circumstances for engagement. It is of international concern and is therefore one of the fundamental areas for PSO training. ROE gives all soldiers direction on how they may use their weapons in particular circumstances. It is vital that every soldier knows what law applies in different circumstances. If he does not, then he may break the law through his actions. If he fires his weapon illegally he may be arrested, investigated and charged.

AUTHORITY

301. ROE are issued by national or multinational headquarters, acting as the mediating agency. This is sometimes linked to the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA). Commanders must also be aware of changes and the body authorized to effect such changes. ROE changes from one mission to another.

POINTS TO NOTE ON THE APPLICATION OF ROE

RESTRICTED

302. ROE defines the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that the application of force is carefully controlled. When commanders give orders to their subordinates, they must ensure that they are within the ROE. Remember, it is the person that pulls the trigger who is most likely to be guilty of the violation of ROE. Some points to remember:

- a. ROE do not give exact details on how to deal with every situation, they give guidance only.
- b. ROE are usually written in the form of prohibitions or permissions (CANNOT or CAN).
- c. Where ROE take the form of prohibitions, there lies a set of orders not to take certain actions.
- d. Where ROE are issued as permissions, they are guidance that certain actions may be taken if judged necessary in carrying out assigned tasks.
- e. The use of force must always acknowledge minimum force, evidence, necessity and transparency.

CLASSIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT IN UN

303. UN equipment are classified under major equipment and self-sustainment. The types of equipment in each of the classes include:

- a. **Major Equipment.** Major equipment consists of items directly related to the unit mission as mutually determined by the UN and the troop contributor. Major equipment can be provided by a troop contributor under either a wet lease or a dry lease arrangement.

- (1) Communications equipment (network).
- (2) Electrical (generating power for base camps).
- (3) Engineering, Medical and Dental equipment.
- (4) Observation equipment (observation posts).
- (5) Accommodation (semi-rigid and or hard structures that can be moved).

RESTRICTED

- (6) Aircraft.
- (7) Armaments.
- (8) Vehicle.
- (9) Equipment arrangements can be made under Wet lease arrangements and Dry lease arrangements.

b. **Self-Sustainment.** Self-sustainment consists of equipment and services provided by a troop contributor to support a unit. Self-sustainment is covered in greater detail in chapter 3, Annex B of the 2020 COE Manual A-75-121. Nonetheless, the self-sustainment requirement for a unit include:

- (1) Catering.
- (2) Communications (Telephone, VHF/UHF-FM Comms, etc).
- (3) Offices.
- (4) Electrical (for sub-units).
- (5) Minor Engineering (permanent rigid structure).
- (6) Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD).
- (7) Laundry and Dry-cleaning.
- (8) Tentage.
- (9) Accommodation.
- (10) Medical.
- (11) Observations (Binoculars, etc)
- (12) Nuclear, biological & chemical (NBC) protection.
- (13) Field Defence Stores.
- (14) Miscellaneous General Stores (Bedding, Furniture, welfare).
- (15) Unique Equipment.

WET LEASE

304. A wet lease arrangement is a reimbursement system for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) whereby the troop contributor assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting major and minor items of equipment deployed. The troop contributor is entitled to

RESTRICTED

reimbursement for providing this maintenance support.

DRY LEASE

305. A dry lease arrangement is a reimbursement system for COE whereby the troop contributor provides equipment to a peacekeeping mission and the UN either assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment or arranges with a third party for maintenance of the equipment.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UN/MISSION LOGISTICS

306. The responsibilities of the mission logistics are as follows:
- a. Conduct Arrival Inspection of the contingent within one month of arrival.
 - b. Conduct Verification Inspections, generally on a quarterly basis.
 - c. Conduct Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) once per mandate or at least each six months of service by the contingent in the mission area.
 - d. Conduct Repatriation Inspections which establish the termination dates for reimbursement payments.
 - e. Provide support to the contingent in accordance with the UN responsibilities under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

UN INSPECTION

307. The UN conducts different types of inspections to ensure all equipment in the mission are working and functioning at its optimal levels. The various types of inspections conducted in the mission area are:

- a. **Arrival Inspection.** The inspection of major equipment will take place immediately upon arrival in the mission area and must be completed within one month. The UN, in consultation with the troop contributor, will decide the

RESTRICTED

time and place of such inspection. If equipment and personnel are already in the mission area when the MOU is concluded, the first inspection will be carried out on a date to be jointly determined by the mission and contingent authorities, and is to be completed within one month of that date.

b. **Operational Readiness Inspections.** ORIs must be conducted at least once every six months based on dates to be determined in advance (feasible for all stakeholders). Wherever feasible, the mission is requested to consult the contingent or unit when scheduling the ORI and take into account ongoing operations or relocations as ordered by the Force Commander (FC).

c. **Repatriation Inspection.** The UN shall carry out an inspection at the time of repatriation of the contingent or component thereof from the mission area. The inspection shall:

- (1) Account for all major equipment of the troop contributor to be repatriated.
- (2) Verify the condition of major equipment provided under the dry lease arrangement to ensure that only equipment of the troop contributor is being repatriated. When circumstances prevent the UN from conducting a repatriation inspection, consideration should be given to using the last validated inspection.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

308. **Principles of PSO.** In PSO there are no enemies. All troops within the mission area are to be regarded as friendly troops. Troops must be conversant with the principles guiding the conduct of this type of operation and these include:

a. **Firmness.** On matters of principle, peace keepers' integrity must show firmness of purpose and excellent solidarity or the force prestige will be lowered. A party to the dispute would use force, but he knows full well that his government or faction will have to answer in the Security

RESTRICTED

Council, ECOWAS or AU later for the use of violence, having to face public opinion as well. To some extent, a peace-keeping force may become hostage to bad behaviour of a party threatening aggression. Terrorists, who are not very concerned about their own reputation, however accompany inhibited by such constraints. Nonetheless, if a government which in fact supports a terrorist group feels itself to be embarrassed by the terrorists' actions, it might be possible to come to a satisfactory agreement.

b. **Impartiality.** Total impartiality and neutrality are essential in order to retain the trust and confidence of the parties to the dispute and of the host government. If and when a peace-keeping force is suspected of favouring one of the parties concerned, the other party will no longer trust the peace-keeping force. Once mutual trust has evaporated, the peace-keeping force will find it difficult to implement its mandate. The parties involved are usually concerned about their honour proper, and an unwise word or act which pokes fun at one of the parties or injures its self-esteem will result in bitterness, non-cooperation, and perhaps hostility, and may jeopardize the peace keeping operation.

c. **Clarity of Intention.** It is essential that both sides are made fully aware of what the peace-keeping forces are trying to achieve and why. Failure in this respect will lead to misunderstandings and distrust, hard to put right.

d. **Anticipation.** Incidents likely to provoke violence should be anticipated and timely action taken to prevent them. This may involve the rapid deployment of peace keeping forces between the 2 sides, before an incident develops into a serious situation, in order to achieve local superiority.

e. **Avoidance of the Use of Force.** The use of force is not an end itself to peace keeping. You must be aware that:

RESTRICTED

- (1) Non-violent methods alone may be enough to solve the problems.
- (2) Conduct and negotiations are essential methods.
- (3) Clever leadership is decisive in achieving good results.
- (4) Initiative on the part of all ranks to carry out the task is vital.

f. **Recognition of Host Government's Authority.** A peace keeping force deployed in a country is invited by its government. It can remain there only as agreed upon by that government. While a peace keeping force enjoys certain immunities, its members however, must respect the host country's laws and customs in turn.

g. **Integration.** A peace keeping force must be integrated in 2 respects:

- (1) The national contingents must all be dependent on one another. This is usually achieved by allotting, inter alia, responsibilities for logistic support, comms, and airlift to different countries so that no contributor is perceived to exercise undue influence.
- (2) When a confrontation is likely between the peace keeping force and one or both of the parties, it is wise to interpose a small group drawn from as many national contingents as possible or a force reserve in order to demonstrate solidarity and to enhance the hostage effect mentioned earlier.

309. **Ethics of Peace Keeping.** The Comd must ensure that the conduct of own troops participating in a PSO conforms with internationally accepted standards and always within the law. Troops must have access to the following:

- a. Code of Conduct (Issued by Higher HQ).

RESTRICTED

- b. Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) - Issued by Unit.
- c. General Conventions.
- d. Order of the day issued by the Force Comd.

310. **Use of Force.** Article 51 of the UN Charter specifically states the customary international law principle underlying all rules of engagement, that is, the inherent right of individual and collective self defence against an armed attack. International law requires that any use of force be in response to hostile acts or a demonstration of hostile intent, and the principle of proportionality requires that the use of force be limited in intensity, duration and scope to that which is necessary to counter the attack and ensure the continued safety of the force. It is important to note that specific rules of engagement for an operation are always classified to prevent giving tactical advantage to any potential threat to the force; however, it is common for a force commander to extract or provide unclassified summary to the troops as was the case with the Joint Force during "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia.

311. **Unit Activities in Mission Area.** Usually the task of participating contingents will be broadly stated in the Mandate and the Force Commander (FC) will further specify the specific tasks of various units in his orders. However, there may be others depending on the nature of the overall mission of the force or when the situation changes. These include:

- a. Observation.
- b. Patrolling.
- c. Interposing.
- d. Control of movement.
- e. Control of supplies.
- f. Guarding of VP/KP and fence area.
- g. Riot control.
- h. Show of force.
- i. Liaison with/between the opposing parties.
- j. Negotiations.
- k. Humanitarian and economic activities.

312. **Community Relations.** In order to win the hearts and minds of the people, own troops will also be engaged in the following humanitarian duties in conjunction with other recognized NGOs like Red Cross, Red Crescent, Medicine Sans Frontiers etc:

- a. Medicine assistance to the local population.
- b. Tracing of missing family members.
- c. Family/loved ones visitation arrangements.
- d. Postal arrangements.
- e. Assistance in the provision of relief aid.
- f. Facilitate the free movement of doctors, nurses and medical supplies to and within remote outlying rural areas, as well as to and within sealed off enclaves.
- g. Medical and casualty evacuation of combatants with the approval of both parties.
- h. Protection and security of minority groups.
- i. Distribution of relief to those in need.
- j. Transportation of persons for transfer/ evacuation.
- k. Mine field marking and clearing.
- l. Material assistance.
- m. Food assistance.
- n. Engineering works.
- o. Building of bridges.
- p. Provision of escorts to oversee and facilitate agricultural activity.
- q. Assistance in negotiating and implementing arrangements for the harvesting and disposal of crops in disputed areas.
- r. Arbitration in disputes over land, water, rights and freedom of movement of humans and animals.
- s. Investigation of cases of theft of or damage to crops.
- t. Liaison assistance over repairs of property, including schools and churches.
- u. Handling and transporting crops across demarcation lines.

RESTRICTED

- v. Assistance in negotiations for the restoration of public services.
- w. Distribution of welfare benefits.
- x. Humanitarian visits.
- y. Resettlement and rehabilitation.
- z. Assist in repair of implements eg trucks, farming implements etc.
- aa. Provision of water.

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS (POC)

313. As crisis erupted in different parts of the world, the UN Security Council authorized the formations of several UN missions with their required mandates. Over time, it was observed that more emphasis should be placed on the protection of most vulnerable people in crisis areas where UN mission exist. This view was amplified after the Rwanda genocide where UN armed personnel was unable to provide protection for the vulnerable civil populace.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

314. Some basic definitions that are applicable to UN missions are discussed as follows:

- a. **Safety**. Protection against accidental events.
- b. **Security**. Protection against intentional damages.
- c. **Threat**. A person or a thing which causes harm.
- d. **Vulnerability**. A weakness which makes one susceptible to harm.
- e. **Risk**. The likelihood of a threat occurring as a result of vulnerabilities.
- f. **Armed Conflict**. Organized violence by groups fighting each other indirectly affects the UN and other non-involved parties
- g. **Terrorism**. Violence by individuals or groups against

RESTRICTED

civilians or other non-combatant targets. Terrorism affects the UN indirectly or directly, for example extremist attacks.

h. **Crime**. Illegal activities undertaken for economic or personal gain May or may not involve violence indirectly and directly affects the UN, for example theft, robbery

i. **Civil Unrest** High Organized demonstrations or unauthorized disturbances to public order, for example rioting and looting may or may not involve violence.

SECURITY LEVEL SYSTEM (SLS)

315. **The SLS assigns a security grade or level.** This is used to identify the over-all level of threat or danger in an area where the UN operates. It provides threat assessment in a specific context. Assigns level of danger. Identifies and measures security threat in specific location. It also identifies levels of danger on a scale of 1 to 6 (from lowest to highest). SLS focuses on "how to stay" rather than "when to go".

6	
5	
4	
3	
Moderate	
2	
1	
Minimal	

RESTRICTED

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF UNITED NATIONS

316. The UN as a body derives its legal framework from internationally accepted laws which are binding on all member states as ratified by the General Assembly. Some of the sources of these laws include:

- a. International Human Rights Law (IHRL).
- b. International Humanitarian Law (IHL).
- c. International Refugee Law (IRL).
- d. International Criminal Law (ICL).
- e. Regional legal regimes.


CURRENT OPERATIONS WITH POC, CRSV AND CP MANDATES

317. The UN Missions currently in existence are enhance to ensure that UN personnel, especially the military components are empowered with the required mandate to provide necessary protection for the vulnerable civil populace. This is because the protection of women, children and the aged in areas where crisis exist is very important. The mandates in UN missions now carry tasks that include: Protection of Civilians (POC), Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and Civilian Populace (CP). The table below shows some UN missions with these tasks in their mandates.

Mission	POC	CRSV	CP	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
MINUSMA				United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
MINUSCA				United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.
UNISFA		x	x	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.
MONUSCO				United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo.
UNAMID				United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

RESTRICTED

UNIFIL		x		United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
UNMISS				United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
MINURSO		x	x	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.



318. The phases of response in UN operations include: Prevention, Pre-emption, Response and Consolidation. Some activities under each phase include:

a. Prevention.

- (1) Physical presence, Patrols and Force deployment.
- (2) Mediation and conflict prevention.
- (3) Advocacy, negotiations with key leaders.
- (4) Human Rights monitoring and reporting.

b. Pre-emption.

- (1) Increase patrol and information gathering.

RESTRICTED

- (2) Ensure military and police presence, intercept, diffuse or neutralize hostile activities using QRF, SF or Reserve Force.
- (3) Political pressure, intensify communication with armed actors and potential parties to the conflict.
- (4) Human Rights monitoring and reporting.

c. **Response.**

- (1) Offensive and defensive military operations.
- (2) Inter-positioning of troops.
- (3) Swift action through the speedy movement of forces such as attack helicopters, QRFs and reconnaissance.
- (4) Mitigation of suffering and evacuation.
- (5) Human Rights monitoring and reporting.
- (6) Support delivering of humanitarian aid.

d. **Consolidation.**

- (1) Mediation and stabilization in post conflict.
- (2) Protection and reassurance of civilians and local authority.
- (3) Support the delivery of immediate medical care if necessary.
- (4) Readjust security (Security Sector Reform,
- (5) Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration, Justice Sector Reform etc).
- (6) Collection of evidence and Human Rights investigations.
- (7) Support delivery of humanitarian aid.

GRADUATED USE OF FORCE

319. The military component in a UN mission may graduate the use of force at these three levels:

RESTRICTED

- a. Physical authoritative presence.
- b. Non deadly force.
- c. Use of deadly force in accordance with mission specific ROE.

UN CORE VALUES

320. The UN Core values are Integrity, Professionalism and Respect for Diversity. Integrity.

- a. Demonstration the values of UN.
- b. Act without consideration of personal gain.
- c. Resist undue political pressure.
- d. Stand by decisions in the organization's interest.
- e. Do not abuse power or authority.
- f. Take prompt action in cases of unprofessional or unethical behavior.
- g. Professionalism.
- h. Show pride in work and achievements.
- i. Demonstrate profession competence.
- j. Be conscientious and efficient in meeting commitments.
- k. Be motivated by professional rather than personal concerns.
- l. Show persistence when faced with challenges.
- m. Remain calm in stressful situations
- n. Respect for Diversity.

- (1) We work effectively with people from all background.
- (2) Treat people with dignity and respect.
- (3) Treat men women equally.
- (4) Show respect for divert point of view.
- (5) Examine own biases and behavior.
- (6) Do not discriminate against individuals or groups.

RESTRICTED

321. **Briefing of visitors at VP/CP.** PSO attract a lot of dignitaries and International observers. It is therefore necessary that all troops, particularly officers and SNCOs know the procedure for briefing of visitors and the content of such briefing; which includes:

- a. Location of the OP/CP.
- b. Task/purpose.
- c. General observation, limitations, observation techniques etc.
- d. Nearest troops positions, HQ, direction and distance to other positions.
- e. Nearest position(s) belonging to other factions in the areas, distance and strength.
- f. Manning of the Ops, Relief of observers and the max time of observation.
- g. Brief about the equipment (very short/simple demo) being used at the OP/CP.
- h. Logistics.
- i. Special regulations.
- j. Latest events. End of brief. Question?

DEBRIEF

322. Units returning from PSO must be properly debriefed. A Comd must ensure that every soldier of his unit contributes to the debriefing. This could be achieved if Platoon Comds first debrief their men when they are about to leave the mission area. Coy Comds will then debrief their Platoon Comds after which they will be debriefed by the CO. This procedure will ensure that whatever information the CO gives while being debriefed on arrival covers every aspect of the operation. Emphasis must be placed on the following during debriefing:

- a. Preparation for the mission prior to departure.
- b. Adequacy of the provision made - Any deficiency? Why?
- c. Problems enroute.
- d. Reception on arrival at mission area.

RESTRICTED

- e. Situation on the ground on arrival at mission area.
- f. Relief in line.
- g. Conduct of the operation; to cover:
 - (1) Unit mission or task and mode of execution.
 - (2) Activities of all other units in the mission area.
 - (3) Areas of security interest to own country.
 - (4) Geography, Politics, economic activities, religion and culture of the mission area.
 - (5) Problems encountered during the operation.
 - (6) Losses in men and material.
 - (7) Potentials of the countries visited (Military, Political and Economic).
 - (8) Desirability of further participation in the operation. Comds are to comment on procedure for rotation of units, especially as it affects the following:
 - (a) Warning Order.
 - (b) Preparation for move.
 - (c) Policy on weight approved per soldier.
 - (d) Policy on procurement of personal effects.
 - (e) Stock-taking.
 - (f) Movement of vehs, eqpt and sp wpns.
 - (g) Movement Order.
 - (h) Manifest.
 - (i) Tps maint enroute.
- h. Reception on arrival at disembarkation point.

CHAPTER 8

ESCORT DUTIES INTRODUCTION

323. As part of protective and defensive measures during emergency or peace time, the Armed Forces would perform the task of escort duties. The escort duties could be as reconnaissance elements, sometimes reinforced with helicopters to support the escort of convoys by carrying out ground and aerial recce respectively.

324. During Internal Security Operations, troops may be required to provide protection for Very Important Personalities(VIP). The death or injury to such VIP could have adverse repercussion or be of tremendous propaganda value to the agitators'/adversary course. There will always be the need to escort VIP, and equipment, weapons, ammunition, troops etc.

AIM

325. The aim of this lesson is to teach Young Officers Cse escort duties.

SCOPE

326. The lesson will cover the following:

- a. Definition of Terms.
- b. Factors to be considered during escort planning.
- c. Preliminaries activities before activities.
- d. Compositions of escort.
- e. Measures for the protection of important personalities during escort.
- f. Method of movement during escort.
- g. Anti-Ambush Drill.
- h. Precautions against Ambush.
- i. Communication and security.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

327. The following are possible definition found in escort duties:

- a. **Escort.** Is a combat unit assigned to company and protect another force, convoy or VIP.
- b. **Vehicle column.** The vehicles to be escorted. The vehicle may either be carrying personnel, arms, ammunition, POL supplies or VIP.
- c. **Convoy.** This is made up of the escorts and the column. The escort commander is normally the convoy commander. It is the procession of vehicles with system under cmd.

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED DURING ESCORT PLANNING

328. The following factors should be taken into account when planning an escort detail:

- a. **Enemy.** The likelihood of an enemy attack and the tactics which they might employ. For example, mines, sniping or road blocks (ambush).
- b. **Ground.** The terrain over which the convoy is to pass with particular reference to defile, close country, built up areas, detour and critical points.
- c. **Escort.** The resources available including, supporting arms, helicopter etc.
- d. **Convoy.** The size and type of vehicle in the convoy and vulnerability of load.
- e. **Time and space.** The time the convoy observes first and last light. Also, the distance to be travelled.
- f. **Logistics.** Arrangements for recovery, POL, tyres, tools, feeding, spares, etc.
- g. **Weather.** It may be necessary to postpone the convoy to guarantee good flying conditions.

PRELIMINARY ACTIVITIES BEFORE ESCORT

329. Ensure that the following are checked carefully before the commencement of convoy movement:

- a. Check all vehicles for fuel, security, load, jerry cans and ropes for towing, tools and spare tyres.
- b. Rehearsals of anti ambush drills for the whole convoy before setting off.
- c. Briefing of VIP or convoy is the convoy commands responsibility.
- d. Ensure that everybody knows the immediate drill in case of accidents.
- e. During halt, all the convoy should adopt all round protection with the escorts covering them.

COMPOSITION OF THE ESCORT

330. The escorting force will be composed of 3 tactical groups as follows:

a. **Vanguard**. They are the leading element of the escort. They consist of armoured vehicles, mounted infantry and sometimes helicopter. Its task is to clear the route of any obstruction, and give warning to the close escort of any danger. It must travel sufficiently far ahead to enable small obstructions to be cleared without interfering with the smooth running of the loose escort.

b. **Close Protection Group**. This should be composed of armoured cars, the VIP car and infantry in armoured or "soft" vehicles. A typical order of march is the following:

- (1) Armoured Car.
- (2) VIP Car.
- (3) Armoured car containing the escort commander.
- (4) Mounted infantry.

This party should move at a steady speed, estimated to conform

RESTRICTED

to the VIPs program and well within the capability of the armoured vehicles. If there is more than one VIP, additional armoured vehicles for their use and additional mounted infantry will be required.

- c. **Rear Guard.** This should be composed of armoured cars (to provide fire power) and mounted infantry. It must move sufficiently far behind the close escort to allow itself freedom of action if the latter is ambushed.

MEASURES FOR PROTECTION OF IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES DURING ESCORT

331. Communication with the operational base and group inter link should be provided. Other measures that may be considered for VIP protection include the following:

- a. Ideally, the armoured vehicle should be used by the VIP during any part of the journey when an attack be expected. At other times, the plan should make possible for him to travel in a more comfortable vehicle.
- b. If the VIP agrees, distinguishing marks should be removed from his vehicle.
- c. In the event of an attack, it is the duty of the close escort to protect the VIP, and get his vehicle out of the danger area as quickly as possible
- d. It make be desirable to provide air cover and to make dummy and live runs along the route against ambush positions.
- e. Secrecy about the details of the move must be maintained for as long as possible.

METHOD OF MOVEMENT DURING ESCORT

332. The vanguard is the first group to move. The movement by the vanguard is by tactical bounds. The vehicle column moves in packets at a constant speed to avoid bucking or struggling maintaining packet

RESTRICTED

distance as well as vehicular distances. The close escort follows the vanguard at certain distance as ordered by the escort commander.

333. The rear guard follows at distance of at least one tactical bound behind the vehicle column. During the movement, vehicle break down must be anticipated and as such a recovery team must be provided within the rear guard. During halts in movement, a perimeter defence must be established. Armoured vehicles must cover areas outwards around the halt area while the infantry sections dismount and form a close perimeter defence.

ANTI-AMBUSH DRILL

334. Anti-ambush drill must be simple and clearly understood by the ranks, it must include the following:

- a. Return fire immediate on conduct and report back to the escort commander/ASA.
- b. Use of smoke grenades to cover the immediate area in other to allow vehicles to manoeuvre into a position of advantage.
- c. Arrangeents for halting and protecting the other convoy not caught in the ambush.
- d. Action to extricate the ambush position.
- e. Instruction for all vehicle drivers to clear the road to permit the escorts to manoeuver.

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST AMBUSH

335. Some of the precaution to be taken against been ambushed are:

- a. Vehicles movement should be limited and strictly controlled.
- b. Vehicles should either be armoured or escorted by armoured vehicles.
- c. Dusty roads should be avoided, if possible.
- d. Anti-mines devices may be used.

RESTRICTED

- e. Use of helicopter during escort, if available.

COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY

336. The commander must maintain a radio link to his controlling HQ. Planning times for any move must be disclosed only on a need to know basis.

CHAPTER 9

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE

1. The military is assigned various tasks during IS situations. These tasks fall under its constitutional roles in aid of civil authority and, therefore, have the necessary legal backing.
2. The objective of this chapter is to provide the candidates with an understanding of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as all the tasks the military is required to perform when invited to intervene in an IS situation. The tasks discussed here must be completed as situations requiring new methods based on prevailing circumstances could arise.

DESCRIPTION OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

3. Improvised Explosive Devices incorporate 5 significant components to function effectively. These components include the main charge, initiator, power source, switch or firing system and casing or container.
 - a. **Container.** A casing or container is an item that houses the whole or principal components of an IED. Containers include gas cylinders, dead animals, pipes, backpacks, jugs, briefcases, vests, and vehicles.
 - b. **Main Charge.** The main charge is the explosive component of an IED. It provides the explosion to destroy the target. Some examples of a primary charge are military explosives such as research department explosives and trinitrotoluene gotten from military munitions; commercial

RESTRICTED

explosives such as dynamite used in quarries are readily available for purchase in the market; and home-made explosives such as ammonium nitrate sourced from fertilisers. The main charge could be mixed with some enhancement like fuel and shrapnel for a more damaging effect.

c. **Initiator**. The initiator is a sensitive, high-explosive device that detonates under relative heat, friction, flash, or shock. They are usually referred to as blasting caps or detonators.

d. **Power Source**. The power source is a component that stores and releases electrical current to initiate an IED. The most commonly used power source in IEDs is the 9V dry cell battery.

e. **Switch or Firing System**. This is the component of an IED designed to actuate or trigger the device. Insurgents and terrorists specifically employ switches to fire or arm an IED.

TYPES OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

4. IEDs are classified in different ways depending on the parameters considered. In terms of mode of operation, IEDs can be categorised into command, victim-operated, radio-operated, timed-operated, vehicle-borne, and person-borne IEDs.

a. **Command IEDs**. Command IEDs are triggered by a wire from the operator to the device. Command action is designed to go off at the terrorist's action. The IED uses a direct link between the firing point and the explosive device, allowing the insurgent to choose the precise moment of initiation. These are often used against targets that have

previously set patterns or against targets of opportunity. The types of command IEDs are:

(1) **Command Wire**. This uses a physical wire connected to the power source. The operator manually triggers the device by joining together the negative and positive ends of a wire to complete the circuit, thereby detonating the IED.

(2) **Command Pull**. This uses a physical pull mechanism. An insulator attached to a cord or a handle is placed between two electrical conductors to stop the complete circuit. The explosion initiates once the operator pulls the cord to remove the insulator.

b. **Victim-operated IED**. The target itself triggers a Victim-operated IED. It could be armed with pressure plates, pull switches or release switches. This is very common with BHT activities in the NE. The most commonly used victim-operated IEDs are,

(1) **Offset**. The main charge, switch, and power source are deployed separately; however, the switch is placed strategically so the victim can easily trigger it.

(2) **All-in-One**. It integrates all components, including the main charge, switch, and initiator, into a single device with the switch on top.

- (3) **The Pressure Plate** integrates all the components in one place except the switch, which is placed separately.
- c. **Radio IED.** Radio-controlled IEDs are triggered when the operator sends a signal via the radio with the help of electromagnetic waves.
- d. **Timed IED.** Timers are set at a specific time to trigger the IED. Some IEDs are constructed with timed or delay switches designed to function at a predetermined time. They are mainly used on stationery targets.
- e. **Vehicle Borne IEDs.** Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) are vehicles primed IEDs. When a suicide bomber is inside the car, it is referred to as a Suicide Vehicle Borne IED (SVBIED). However, some key features or characteristics of the Vehicle Borne IEDs may aid detection. These include irregular additions, noticeable sagging, and unusual scratches.
- f. **Person Borne IED.** Suicide bombers carry Person Borne IEDs. A Suicide bomber carries a vest rigged with explosives. The IED is triggered by the suicide bomber or by another operator from a distance. Suicide bombers could also use vehicles rigged with explosives in their attack.

TACTICAL SIGN RECOGNITION AWARENESS

5. It is the ability to detect or deduce signs of a potential threat;

it enhances a soldier's capabilities to recognise or identify enemy activities that could endanger their troops.

DEFINITION OF SIGN

6. It is any evidence of change from the natural state's influence upon the environment by the passage of man, animal or machinery.

CATEGORIES OF SIGN

7. The following are the categories of signs:

a. **Top Sign.** This is any sign from the ankle above to the height of the person or equipment carried. This could be markings on trees or pieces of clothing on a tree.

b. **Ground Sign.** Any sign from the ankle below to the ground. Concealment of an IED will inevitably leave an element of a ground sign. The following are the characteristics of ground signs: discardable, colour change, disturbance, transference regularity and flattening.

8. **Discardable.** These are items that the enemy may intentionally or unintentionally leave behind at the emplacement site of an IED. Examples of discardable are cigarette butts, wires and bits of tape used for concealing IED components.

9. **Colour Change.** When the enemy places an IED in the ground, the disturbance of the ground often leads to a colour variation between the soil above the IED and the surrounding area. Colour change could also result from footsteps on green vegetation and the effects of the explosive chemicals on the colour of the soil.

10. **Disturbance.** Disturbance results from distortion in the natural arrangement of an environment. Disturbed organic matter

or leaves under a shelter belt, discontinuation of a vehicle's tyre print along the main supply route, or a change in the colour of stagnant water could indicate an IED activity within that area.

11. **Transference**. Transference occurs when the IED takes soil or any other material from one area to conceal the IED at a separate location. Often, the transferred material will not naturally blend with the surrounding area. Examples of transference include shrubs or branches of another tree used to conceal an IED. Additionally, wet soil found within the dry environment or sand transferred by foot from one place to another could be a sign of IED activities.

12. **Regularity**. Straight lines, circular, rectangular, or square shapes rarely exist in nature. When the terrorist tries to conceal an IED, some things appear out of place compared to nature's emplacement of soil, rocks, and vegetation. The lines and shapes could be attempts to conceal command wire, pull lines, trip lines, mines or pressure plates.

13. **Flattening**. Flattening occurs after a hole is filled back in. Air trapped between particles of soil escapes over time, and the top of the filled area collapses to a lower level than that of the surrounding area. This is often evident after rains and extended periods.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INDICATORS

14. The primary indication of an IED will be a change in the environment. Vigilant observation of these subtle indicators can increase the likelihood of security operatives detecting IEDs before they detonate. Examples of possible roadside IED indicators include but are not limited to the following:

a. **Suspicious Vehicles**. Vehicles acting strangely,

RESTRICTED

following or ahead of your convoy for a long distance and then pulling over to the side of the road should be suspected.

b. **Freshly Dug Holes, New Dirt, Piles of Rock or Gravel.** These are indications that someone recently buried something in the ground that might be an IED.

c. **Visible or Hidden Wires.** Look out for coloured wires, visible or dug in. Wires are an essential indicator of IED presence.

d. **Markers.** Markers are natural or artificial features used to trigger the IED at the right time or serve as warnings to unsuspecting troops about possible IEDs. The terrorist may leave behind visual indicators of an implanted device by accident or on purpose to inform fellow members of the terrorist group.

e. **Unexploded Ordnances.** If you find any unexploded ordnance you didn't drop or place there, don't pick it up. It may kill or injure you. Mark the location and report the findings accordingly.

COUNTER-IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE MEASURES

15. Counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) measures are based on three pillars: attacking the network, preparing the force, and defeating the device. These pillars could be undertaken at various levels of warfare.

a. **Attacking the Network.** Efforts to attack the network include actions and activities against IED networks designed to interrupt the enemy's chain of activities by identifying and exploiting the networks' vulnerabilities and enabling offensive action against them. Success is based on

improved intelligence analysis tools, persistent surveillance, reconnaissance, and information operations.

b. **Preparing the Force.** Preparing the force encompasses (C-IED) training at all levels, training on new equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures, and information management and dissemination.

c. **Defeat the Device.** Defeating the device involves the actions and activities of the troops to detect IEDs, neutralise them before they can be detonated, or mitigate the effects of detonation at the point of attack.

ACTIONS ON SIGHTING AN IED

16. Handling scenarios involving IEDs is a very delicate affair. Experts in Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) have provided a drill sequence called the 5 Cs to ensure safe handling. This guide would help you in the event of an encounter with a suspected IED. **The 5 'C's Sequence is as follows: Confirm, Clear, Call, Cordon, and Control.**

a. **Confirm.** From a safe distance, look for IED indicators while attempting to confirm the suspected IED. Use all tools, including moving to a better vantage point and visual observation, to look for signs of an IED.

b. **Clear.** Evacuate the area to a safe distance of 300 meters around the IED. Assess whether your distance and cover are adequate and direct people from the danger area. Sweep the area for any secondary device or trigger person. Once the scene is safe, question, search, and detain as needed.

c. **Call.** Call your higher headquarters and let them

RESTRICTED

know what you have found by giving the following information:

- (1) Date and Time of your finding.
 - (2) Location of the IED.
 - (3) How can the EOD Team contact the reporting unit?
 - (4) The best route is for the EOD Team.
- d. **Cordon.** Establish blocking positions to prevent vehicle and foot traffic from approaching the IED. Establish a 360-degree inner and outer cordon to secure and dominate the area.
- e. **Control.** Control the area until C-IED Operators arrive. Clear and set up an Entry Control Point (ECP) for first responders.

ACTION IN THE EVENT OF AN IED EXPLOSION

17. The following information should be given in the event of evacuation from the location of an IED or bomb explosion. The people being evacuated should know:

- a. Why are they being evacuated?
- b. The location of the IED.
- c. Their temporary shelter and
- d. A safe route and how to get there.

REACTIONS ON IED ATTACK

18. The expected initial reactions of troops in the event of an IED bomb explosion are as follows;

- a. Treat it as an ambush.
- b. Be conscious of direct and indirect enemy fire.
- c. Return fire within the ROE.
- d. Be conscious of a secondary explosion.
- e. Provide first aid if required.
- f. Attempt to locate the bomber.
- g. Send initial SITREP.
- h. Freeze movement, record all information, then send final SITREP.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

19. The following safety precautions must be observed:

- a. Do not take risks to save life, eqpt or property.
- b. Always be alert.
- c. Keep up-to-date with terrorist eqpt and techniques.
- d. Avoid searching at night if you can, except there are strong Op reasons for doing so.
- e. Always assume that suspicious items are booby-

trapped.

- f. Do not touch anything if it has to be moved; check for a booby trap and move it by remote means (Hook and Line kits).
- g. Do not allow movement to be channelled.
- h. Apply all procedures correctly and obey safety precautions, particularly safety distance.
- i. Ensure the soak time is applied correctly.

SELF ASSESSMENT QUESTIONS

1. List components of an IED.
2. Mention types of IEDs.
3. List categories of signs.
4. What actions should be carried out on sighting an IED?